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Three Essays inMicroeconometrics
Abstract
This PhD dissertation discusses three important topics in labor economics. It consists
of three chapters that inquire into the integration of migrants and their socioeconomic
outcomes in the host country market by relying on an empirical framework combined
with economic theory. The first chapter explores whether naturalization leads to faster
occupational assimilation for immigrants in the labor market in Germany. In particular,
the empirical analysis in this paper investigates whether immigrants become occupa-
tionally more mobile after naturalization and if this leads to better jobs in the labor mar-
ket. Instrumental variable estimation is exploited to control for the time-invariant and
-variant unobserved individual characteristics. In order to do so, changes in German im-
migration law in the 1990s is used as an instrument for naturalization. The results show
that naturalization is not associated with an immediate increase in occupational mobil-
ity. Instead, the years following naturalization are associated with higher occupational
mobility, which implies that immigrants use naturalization in the German labor market
to pursue better occupation match and faster occupational assimilation. The second
chapter exploits the September 11 as an exogenous event to explore whether September
11 decreased the exit rate from unemployment of immigrants from Muslim countries in
the UK labor market. The empirical analysis exploits discrete time duration models. The
results show that the exit rate from unemployment to paid employment decreases after
the September 11 terrorist attacks for immigrants from Muslim countries compared to
UK-born white population with similar socioeconomic characteristics. Moreover, a sig-
nificant increase in the unemployment spell is found for the first generation immigrants
from Muslim countries while no impact is found on second generation immigrants. The
last chapter addresses issues related to religious identity which have been questioned
more intensively in recent years. The first part of the empirical analysis answers the
question about the extent to which religious identity is transmitted from one genera-
tion to the next by using longitudinal data from Germany. In addition, the empirical
analysis investigates how socio-economic characteristics influence the transmission of
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religious traits across generations. Furthermore, the paper explores whether migration
background plays a role in the transmission process. The results show that parents play
an important role in the development of the religious identity of their children in Ger-
many. The transmission or religious traits across generations varies according to the
socio-economic characteristics of transmitter and religious groups. Finally, the empiri-
cal research shows that migration background is an important factor in the transmission
process. The results reveal that vertical transmission is higher among immigrant families
by using data from Indonesia and Turkey.
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Chapter 1
Occupational Mobility and Impact of
German Citizenship on Occupational
Assimilation
Metin Nebiler
Abstract
Naturalization has been used as an important tool by immigrants to integrate into host
countries. This article examines whether naturalization leads to faster occupational as-
similation of immigrants in the labor market in Germany. In particular, the empirical
analysis in this paper investigates whether immigrants become occupationally more mo-
bile after naturalization and if this leads to better jobs in the labor market. The empirical
analysis identifies the impact of naturalization on occupational mobility by eliminating
other factors such as self selection, time-invariant, and -variant unobserved character-
istics. Instrumental variable estimation is exploited to control for the time-invariant
and -variant unobserved individual characteristics. In order to do so, we introduce the
changes in the immigration law in Germany in 1990s as an instrument for naturaliza-
tion. The law change provides an exogenous variation in the naturalization process. The
results show that naturalization is not associated with an immediate increase in occu-
pational mobility. Instead, the years following naturalization are associated with higher
occupational mobility, which implies that immigrants use naturalization in the German
labor market to pursue better occupation match and faster occupational assimilation.
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1.1 Introduction
Naturalization has been used as an important tool by immigrants to integrate into
host countries. Acquisition of citizenship provides several benefits for immigrants
while it is considered to be a strong commitment for the future. This article exam-
ines whether naturalization leads to faster occupational assimilation for immigrants
in the labor market in Germany. In particular, empirical analysis in this paper investi-
gates whether immigrants become occupationally more mobile after naturalization
and if this leads to better jobs in the labor market.
At a scholarly level discussions among economists has focused mainly on deter-
minants of naturalization and its effect on wage assimilation or employment. Several
studies show that labor market outcomes are increasing with the acquisition of cit-
izenship (Fougre and Safi (2009), Bratsberg et al. 2002 ). Naturalized immigrants
earn higher wages than non-naturalized counterparts with similar characteristics
(Chiswick (1978); DeVoretz and Pivnenko 2006). Employment rate and probability
of being employed in a white collar job increase with the acquisition of citizenship
(Bratsberg et al. 2002, Steinhardt 2008). In their seminal paper, Bratsberg et al. (2002)
suggest that the higher wages of naturalized immigrants is a result of being employed
at higher paid jobs by using both cross-sectional and longitudinal data. Similarly,
Steinhardt (2008) finds an immediate increase in wages after naturalization but also
an accelerated increase in wages in the following years after naturalization in Ger-
many1. Most recently, Gathmann and Keller (2014) find low benefit of citizenship
for men and substantial benefit for women by using discontinuities in the eligibility
rules introduced by changes in immigration law in Germany in the 1990s.
Acquisition of host country citizenship can provide several benefits including more
job opportunities for naturalized immigrants. First, some jobs require German citi-
zenship i.e. public jobs, self employed personal services, etc. (Steinhardt 2008). Sec-
ond, employers may want to hire German citizens because of their preferences, fewer
administrative costs, or free movement in the EU countries. On the other hand, value
of German citizenship is different for individuals. In addition to greater employment
opportunities, it provides further benefits such as right to vote, permanent residence
and work permit, right to travel without visa in the EU, etc. There are also costs of
1See also Scott 2008, Hayfron 2008.
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entailed in applying for the German citizenship i.e. time spent on the application
process, loss of previous citizenship, exposure to ethnic criticism, etc. Furthermore,
the country of origin of individuals is very important for the naturalization decision.
Immigrants from the EU states or states which have bilateral agreement with Ger-
many on dual citizenship have the right to keep their previous citizenship, while this
is not possible for other non-EU countries. Hence, obtaining the German citizenship
is more costly for immigrants from non-EU countries but also provides higher bene-
fits. Therefore, immigrants who are utility maximizing agents have greater incentives
to apply for German citizenship if they have a positive expected benefit.
Bratsberg et al. (2002) shows that after naturalization immigrants have a superior
job distribution compared to non-naturalized immigrants. A neglected question in
the literature is the mechanism behind the link between naturalization and better
jobs. Do immigrants switch to better jobs immediately after the citizenship acquisi-
tion or spend some time before finding a satisfactory job? This article studies whether
naturalization increases the occupational mobility of immigrants. Immigrants might
move to better jobs immediately after naturalization. Alternatively, better job dis-
tribution of naturalized immigrants might be associated with higher occupational
mobility of those immigrants. In particular, occupational mobility after naturaliza-
tion can increase since immigrants can try to find better firm/sector match with the
increasing job opportunities in the labor market.
It is well reported that when entering the host country labor market, immigrants
are employed at lower level jobs compared to natives with similar individual char-
acteristics. With the time spent in the host country labor market, some immigrants
climb the ladder in the labor market while some remain trapped in certain sectors
(self employed, ethnic labor market, etc.). For instance, an immigrant from Turkey
who is an economist can start working in a kebap shop, then become a waiter in a
hotel, continue as a salesperson in a store and finally work as an economist in a bank.
Obtaining the German citizenship can encourage immigrants to adjust their career
path so that those immigrants are more likely to change occupations compared to
non-naturalized immigrants. In other words, immigrants can use naturalization as a
tool to find a better sector/firm match, which can lead to higher occupational mobil-
ity until a satisfying job is found.
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Alternatively, higher occupational mobility after naturalization can be the result
of self-selection, in the sense that immigrants who were occupationally mobile be-
fore the citizenship acquisition are more likely to naturalize. Naturalization and occu-
pational mobility can be correlated because of unobserved individual characteristics
such as commitment or motivation. Naturalized immigrants can be more motivated
or committed to perform better in the labor market, hence, change jobs more fre-
quently compared to non-naturalized immigrants even before the German citizen-
ship. This type of time-invariant unmeasured individual characteristics can cause
biased estimates if not accounted for.
Similarly, naturalization can be associated with time-variant unobserved individ-
ual heterogeneity. For instance, a common reason for applying for naturalization is
that employers may ask their immigrant workers to obtain the German citizenship
even if the latter have no intention to naturalize. The reason behind this can be ad-
ministrative costs of hiring a non-German citizen or individual preferences of em-
ployers. Even though this is neglected in previous studies, occupational mobility can
be correlated with the unobserved time-variant individual characteristics, which can
bias the results.
This research paper focuses on the impact of German citizenship on occupational
mobility of immigrants in the German labor market. Individuals are described as oc-
cupationally mobile if they report a different occupation than the last employment.
The empirical analysis presents several estimation methods to eliminate the factors
such as self selection, time-invariant, and -variant unobserved characteristics. First,
probit estimates from the pooled sample by using the German Socio-Economic Panel
are reported. According to estimates, acquisition of German citizenship increases
the job mobility of immigrants compared to non-naturalized immigrants with simi-
lar socioeconomic characteristics. Although results from the pooled sample depict
a general picture, the well documented self-selection problem is not accounted for.
Thus, the higher occupational mobility can be a result of unobserved characteristics
of individuals who are naturalized. An alternative solution is to use the longitudinal
feature of the data and estimate a fixed effect logit regression which controls for un-
observed time-invariant heterogeneity among individuals. Results from fixed effects
model indicate a small and insignificant correlation between naturalization and oc-
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cupational mobility, and a negative correlation between years since naturalization
and occupational mobility. However, the fixed effects model does not control for po-
tential time-variant unmeasured characteristics. More importantly, it restricts the
sample and estimates a smaller sample where sample selection can be a major prob-
lem.
Next, the empirical analysis continues with instrumental variable estimation to
control for the time-invariant and -variant unobserved individual characteristics. Sim-
ilar to Gathmann et al (2014), changes in the immigration law in Germany in 1990s
are introduced as an instrument for naturalization. The law change provides an ex-
ogenous variation in naturalization process. Since the requirements depend on age
and years spent in Germany, immigrants with similar characteristics but with differ-
ent age and years spent in Germany have different eligibility years for German citizen-
ship. Hence, I use the eligibility criteria as an instrument for the naturalization. The
results show that naturalization is not associated with immediate increase in occupa-
tional mobility. Instead, the years following naturalization are associated with higher
occupational mobility which implies that immigrants use naturalization in the Ger-
man labor market to find a better occupation match. Finally, the last section investi-
gates whether naturalization leads to faster occupational assimilation in the German
labor market. Results reveal that naturalized immigrants are more likely to experi-
ence upward occupational mobility compared to to non-naturalized immigrants.
The contribution of this paper to literature is that it is the first attempt to investi-
gate the link between citizenship acquisition and occupational mobility in the labor
market. This question has never been addressed before since papers mostly focus on
the benefits of naturalization on wages and employment. However, naturalization
can also influence the behavior of immigrants such that they can change occupation
more frequently. Thus, this can lead to better jobs and explain part of the benefits
of naturalization in the labor market. Furthermore, changes in the German immigra-
tion law is used to eliminate the well reported self selection problem in naturalization
literature.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the citizenship law in
Germany. Section 1.3 explains the empirical model used in the article while section
1.4 presents the data. Results are presented in section 1.5 and finally, section 1.6
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discusses the results and concludes.
1.2 Citizenship Law in Germany
Immigration to Germany started in 1960s with the arrival of labor workers after the
World War II. Those immigrants, referred as "guest workers", were expected to return
to their home countries. Not only did they choose to stay in Germany but also fam-
ily members arrived in Germany soon after through family reunification processes,
which increased the number of immigrants substantially. For an immigrant country,
Germany had a very strict immigration law until 1990s. Although it was possible to
have access to German citizenship, there were no explicit requirements for the natu-
ralization process; only German descendants2 were able to obtain the citizenship by
birth. One way of acquiring the citizenship for immigrants was to marry a German
citizen. However, the final decision was taken by local authorities, who had the right
to reject the application.
In early 1990s, the legal situation changed substantially. In particular, the new im-
migration law, which came into force on 1 January 1991, included explicit criteria for
the naturalization process. Fulfilling the requirements was enough to get the German
nationality. The new law included several requirements for immigrants who wanted
to obtain the German citizenship. These requirements were to have legal residence
in Germany, to be associated with social assistance, to give up the previous national-
ity3, and to have no criminal background. The residency requirement differed among
individuals depending on age. An individual who was 23 years old or older required
at least 15 years of legal residence while it was at least 8 years for an immigrant who
was between the age of 16 and 22.
Changes in the immigration law continued in 1999. According to the new law
that entered into force on 1 January 2000, legal residency requirement was reduced
to eight years for every individual independent of their age. In addition, agreements
for dual citizenship were signed with more countries. On the other hand, knowledge
2Individuals whose parents have German citizenship.
3Immigrants from the EU states or states which have bilateral agreement with Germany on dual citizenship
have the right to keep their previous nationality while immigrants from other countries have to give up their
previous nationality to obtain the German citizenship.
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of German language was added as another criterion. An important change was to
allow the second (or further) generation immigrants to have the German citizenship
by birth4. These individuals were able to keep two citizenships (German and parents’
country) until the age of 23, when they had to decide between one of the two citizen-
ships. Finally in 2008, Germany introduced a naturalization test that individuals have
to pass in order to naturalize. The citizenship law changes in Germany in 1991 and
2000 are used to construct the eligibility for German citizenship as an instrument for
naturalization.
1.3 Empirical Model
The link between citizenship and the labor market outcomes has been widely stud-
ied by economists and sociologists. Studies mainly focus on wage and employment
of naturalized immigrants compared to non-naturalized counterparts. This research
paper is the first empirical attempt to analyze the link between occupational mobil-
ity and host country citizenship. The empirical analysis models the relationship be-
tween naturalization and occupational mobility as follows,
OCCi t =1{α0+α1Ni t +α2Ni t (Ei t −Ei N )+α3Ei t +α4 Xi t +α5Y SMi t +α6Ni t Y SNi t +φi +²i t } (1.1)
where OCCi t refers to occupational change which takes value 1 if the individual i
changes occupation and 0 otherwise. 1{.} is an indicator function, Ni t is an indicator
variable which takes value 1 if the individual i is naturalized at time t, Ei t is expe-
rience in the labor market at time t, Ei N is the experience after naturalization, Xi t
is the set of control variables, Y SMi t is the years since migration, Y SNi t is the years
since naturalization,φi is the individual fixed effect, and ²i t is a transitory shock. The
set of independent variables are aimed to control for observable characteristics of in-
dividuals. Age, gender, education, and country of origin are included since they are
expected to have an important impact on occupational mobility.
The empirical analysis here first reports the results from probit estimation using
the pooled sample from 1991-2011. This model considers that the naturalization is
exogenous to occupational mobility and is the best specification if the unobserved
4Any individual born in Germany, either German descendant or not, had the right to obtain the citizenship.
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individual heterogeneity is ignored. The individual fixed effect, φi , is excluded from
the regression in this model. The above specification allows us to estimate the impact
of naturalization on occupational mobility through two channels. First, α1 captures
the immediate impact of naturalization on occupational mobility. Second, instead
of a sudden impact, occupational mobility can increase in the years following the
naturalization which is captured by α6. The estimation results from the pooled sam-
ple provide a general picture of the impact of naturalization and several explanatory
variables on occupational mobility.
Empirical models that study citizenship have to take into consideration the self-
selection problem at the naturalization process. For instance, those who obtain host
country citizenship have better educational attainment, higher occupational status
and wages relative to non-naturalized immigrants (Yang 1994, Steinhardt 2008, Brats-
berg et al. 2002). Regression analysis includes observable characteristics as indepen-
dent variables to explain observable differences among individuals. Furthermore,
citizenship acquisition can be correlated with unobservable characteristics. Immi-
grants who naturalize may have higher motivation or commitment to achieve better
in the German labor market. Alternatively, the higher occupational mobility of natu-
ralized immigrants might be attributed to the fact that immigrants who are occupa-
tionally more mobile are also the ones more likely to apply for German citizenship.
Those who are occupationally more mobile can use naturalization as an opportunity
to reach better jobs. This can be directly associated with higher occupational mobil-
ity independent of obtaining the German citizenship for those immigrants. A recent
study in Germany among immigrants who are at the naturalization process confirms
this kind of behavior. Table 1.1 shows the outcomes of a survey in Germany, accord-
ing to which more than 80 percent of immigrants who are at the naturalization pro-
cess report that having more job opportunities is one of the main reasons that they
applied for German citizenship (Blicke et al. 2011)5.
The pooled probit estimation will provide biased estimates if individual unob-
served heterogeneity is not accounted for. An alternative solution is to use fixed-
effects model to control for time-invariant unobservable characteristics. The individ-
ual fixed effect,φi , in equation 1.1 captures the individual time-invariant characteris-
5The survey is conducted among the immigrants who are at the naturalization process.
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tics which can have an impact on the occupational mobility such as motivation, com-
mitment, etc. Thus, logit fixed effect estimation strategy is exploited in the empirical
analysis. The fixed-effect model contains a particular disadvantage in terms of the
estimated sample. This model excludes from the estimation those individuals whose
occupation does not change during the time participated in the survey. For instance,
individuals who never change sectors or change sectors in every period are dropped
out in equation 1.1. Thus, the sample that is used to estimate the fixed effects is dif-
ferent than the sample estimated with the pooled sample. The estimation of fixed
effect results can differ from the results reported by using the probit estimation from
the pooled data because the samples that are used in the analysis are different.
Finally, naturalized immigrants can have time-variant unobserved heterogeneity
which has been often overlooked in the literature. A common reason to apply for Ger-
man citizenship can be because there is a prior demand by employers. The reason
behind this can be administrative costs of hiring a non-German citizen or individual
preferences of employers. This type of individual heterogeneity is described as time-
variant since immigrants may not have any intention to naturalize. Fixed-effects esti-
mation can control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity but cannot control
for time-variant unobserved individual heterogeneity. Any model that does not con-
trol for this type of unobserved heterogeneity can have biased estimation results.
According to the previous discussion, estimation of probit equation by using pooled
sample and the fixed effects analysis might not reveal the correct relationship be-
tween naturalization and occupational mobility. Thus, this research paper suggests
another possible solution to this kind of problem by using the recent changes in citi-
zenship law in Germany as an instrument for naturalization.
1.3.1 Eligibility as a Proxy for Naturalization
The main concern with equation 1.1 is the unobserved individual heterogeneity. The
probit model does not control for unobserved heterogeneity. Fixed effects models
control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity but restrict the sample and do
not control for time-variant unobserved heterogeneity, which is correlated with nat-
uralization and affects occupational mobility through ²i t . This section introduces an
instrumental variable approach that exploits in its empirical analysis changes in im-
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migration law to identify the impact of naturalization on occupational mobility. Law
changes provide an exogenous variation which allows us to use it as an instrumental
variable.
Two Stage Least Squares Approach
I use a two-stage least square approach to address the endogeneity. The first stage
estimates the regression equation using OLS where naturalization is the dependent
variable. In the second stage, the predicted values from the first stage are replaced
with the endogenous variable in the main equation. In particular, we estimate two
stage least squares (2SLS) and two stage predictor substitution (2SPS). A two stage
regression method consists of the following system of equations,
OCCi t =β0+β1Nˆi t +β2Nˆi t (Ei t −Ei N )+β3Ei t +β4Xi t +β5Y SMi t +β6Nˆi t Y SNi t +ui t
(1.2)
Ni t = γ1ELi t +γ2Zi t +ωi t (1.3)
where OCCi t refers to occupational change which takes value 0 if the individual i
changes occupation and 0 otherwise, Nˆi t is the predicted value from equation 1.3,
Ni t is an indicator variable which takes value 1 if the individual i is naturalized at
time t, 1{.} is an indicator function, Ei t is experience in the labor market at time t,
Ei N is the experience after naturalization, Xi t is the set of control variables,Y SNi t
is the years since naturalization, ELi t is the indicator variable which takes value 1
if individual i is eligible for German citizenship and 0 otherwise, Zi t is the set of all
exogenous variables in equation 1.2, and ui t and ωi t are transitory shocks.
The two stage least squares estimation strategy takes care of time-invariant and
-variant unobserved individual characteristics. In equation 1.3, eligibility is used as
an instrument for naturalization. To define eligibility for citizenship after the 1990
and 1999 law changes, we use information on the immigrant’s year of birth and ar-
rival to Germany. The validity of the empirical strategy depends on two important as-
sumptions: (i) eligibility for German citizenship is not correlated with occupational
mobility, (ii) eligibility is correlated with naturalization behavior. Eligibility for citi-
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zenship is expected to satisfy the assumption that it is correlated with the naturaliza-
tion behavior of immigrants since immigrants have to qualify to apply for the Ger-
man citizenship. One concern might be naturalization through other possible proce-
dures such as marriage, refugee status, etc. If the number of those individuals is large
enough, eligibility may not be correlated with the naturalization.
Although eligibility is more likely to be exogenous, exclusion restrictions have to
be satisfied. It requires that eligibility is not correlated with occupational mobility
directly or through ². First, it is less likely that eligibility directly affects occupational
mobility. Eligibility to apply for German citizenship does not provide any benefits for
immigrants, instead benefits are received after naturalization. One possible channel
is that immigrants who just become eligible can change their behavior in the labor
market by becoming more mobile since they expect to obtain the German citizenship.
Second and more importantly, eligibility can be correlated with occupational mobil-
ity through language. Immigrants who are residents for more than 8 or 15 years are
more likely to be proficient in German compared to non-eligible immigrants. It can
be an important source of violation of the eligibility instrument if better language
skills are associated with higher occupational mobility in the labor market.
Equation 1.3 is estimated in the first stage to obtain the predicted values to in-
clude in the estimation of equation 1.2, second stage regression. As Angrist and
Kruger (2001) showed, the functional form of the first equation should be linear since
the consistency in the second stage depends on the correct specification of the first
stage functional form. Thus, 2SLS provides consistent estimates while there is no ev-
idence on the consistency of the 2SPS (Wooldridge, 2009). Thus, several functional
forms are used in the empirical analysis. First, predicted values from linear prob-
ability model specification are used in the second stage IV regression. Later, I use
the predicted probabilities from the probit model by using the maximum likelihood
estimation. Then, equation 1.2 is estimated using the predicted values with linear
probability and probit models.
Bivariate Probit Approach
Bivariate probit estimation strategy is another approach to tackle endogeneity in a
system of regressions with two binary dependent variables. This estimation is differ-
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ent from two stage IV estimation, since it is a recursive method in which error terms
are assumed to be correlated. Consider the following system of equations,
OCCi t =1{θ0+θ1Nˆi t+θ2Nˆi t (Ei t−Ei N )+θ3Ei t+θ4Xi t+θ5Y SMi t+θ6Nˆi t Y SNi t+vi t }
(1.4)
Ni t =1{δ1ELi t +δ2Zi t +ei t } (1.5)
where variables above are as defined previously. The error terms are assumed to have
the following form
v = ηi +ξ (1.6)
e = ηi +ν
where ηi is the common error term, ξ and ν are independent error terms. Typically, v
and e have zero mean and a finite variance. The consistency of estimation results de-
pends on the assumption that eligibility is correlated with naturalization but uncor-
related with occupational mobility. As discussed previously, eligibility satisfies this
requirement which leads to consistent estimation results from the system of equa-
tions.
1.4 Data
The data that are used in the empirical analysis is the German Socio-Economic panel
(GSOEP). It is a longitudinal survey that is conducted every year by the German In-
stitute for Economic Research (DIW) in Berlin. The survey started in 1984 in West
Germany with around 4,500 household while the East Germany sample is included
in the survey in 1990. The survey collects socio-economic information at the house-
hold and individual level. The data allow us to identify the occupational mobility
and the naturalization year of the individuals taking part in the survey. Another ad-
vantage of the data is the oversampling of immigrants. The empirical analysis uses
21 waves in the period of 1991-2011.
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The GSOEP is an unbalanced panel data with information on labor market out-
comes and citizenship status of interviewed respondents. The data provides infor-
mation about the occupational history of immigrants before and after the naturaliza-
tion event in addition to change of citizenship in the immigrants panel. I exclude
individuals who are German citizens without migration background. Also individu-
als with migration background but naturalized before they participated in the survey
are removed from the sample. Finally, respondents who obtained the German citi-
zenship before 1991 are excluded from the sample to exploit the law changes after
1991. Our final sample includes only individuals with migration background which
includes both first and second generation immigrants. The sample used in this sur-
vey consists of 15,676 observations and 2,443 individuals interviewed between 1991
and 2011.
1.4.1 Occupational Mobility in the GSOEP
The dependent variable in the empirical analysis is occupational mobility of immi-
grants. This research paper identifies the occupation of respondents by using the
International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88) code developed by
the International Labor Office (ILO). The ILO provides four different types of ISCO-
88 codes according to detail levels. First, the most general coding system is one-digit
ISCO-88 code which includes 9 groups, while two-digit code consists of 28 job groups
which are subgroup of one-digit code. Further, occupational code in three digits spec-
ify 116 occupations. Finally, the most detailed four-digit ISCO-88 code provides 390
occupations.
In the literature, the four-digit occupational code is used more frequently. Individ-
uals are identified as occupationally mobile in a year if they report a different occupa-
tion than previous year. If the individual is unemployed in the current year, he/she
is excluded from the sample in that year. If the respondent is unemployed in the pre-
vious year, the last employment is taken into consideration. Thus, the occupational
mobility is an indicator variable which takes value 1 if the individual is occupationally
mobile and 0 otherwise.
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Measurement Error
A significant number of studies show that surveys suffer from the measurement er-
ror while assigning respondents into specific occupations6. Typically, there are two
sources of measurement error. First, it can arise as a result of survey design. The
question on occupation is not included in each wave of the GSOEP, instead individ-
uals are asked to report their occupation in some years. In other years, respondents
are asked to report their occupation if there is a change in their employment status.
For example, if an individual changes job in 1992 but didn’t report it (job change can
be after the interview) in 1992, he/she will be assigned with the previous job in the
survey while the job change is included in the survey next year. Second, the mea-
surement error can originate from misreporting or coding mistakes. It is possible
that respondents report wrong occupations in the interview as well as the coder can
make mistakes while assigning the respondents into the ISCO-88 code.
To reduce the measurement error, we use a similar approach followed by Isaoglu
(2009). The GSOEP provides information on the employment history of each individ-
ual in detail. This variable keeps track of exact employment changes in every wave.
First, the exact year of job change is decided. It is possible that an individual is in-
terviewed in year t and changed job after the interview in the same year. Thus, the
individual reports a different occupation in year t+1. We correct the this type of error
by following the variable in interest. Second, a different occupation can be reported
in year t, although the individual did not change job in year t-1 and t. In the case of
no job change, the occupation reported in year t is replaced by the occupation in year
t-1 while this individual is not reported as occupationally mobile.
Figure 1.1 illustrates occupational mobility before and after the correction. As
mentioned by Isaoglu (2009), it is more likely that the spikes exist as a result of survey
design. The coding error does not explain the spikes illustrated in the graph since one
would expect similar errors across years. Figure 1.2 shows the occupational mobility
in the GSOEP after the correction of measurement error. The occupational mobility
in the German labor market is consistent with the one of Isaoglu (2009) which varies
between 3 and 10 percent.
Figure 1.3 compares occupational mobility between immigrants and natives. Al-
6Isaoglu 2009, Kambourov and Manovskii (2002a, 2002b), McCall (1990), Neal (1999) and Parent (2000)
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though occupational mobility of immigrants and natives are similar, immigrants are
occupationally more mobile than natives in general. The occupational mobility of
immigrants in the 90s is lower than that of natives: immigrants change occupations
more frequently between 2000 and 2011. The implication of these results might be
that immigrants are more mobile compared to natives because they are employed in
lower level jobs.
Figure 1.4 depicts occupational mobility among eventually naturalized immigrants
and non-naturalized immigrants. Although it is unconditional occupational mobility,
Figure 1.4 shows that immigrants with German citizenship are more mobile. This can
be explained by the fact that naturalization opens the door to more job opportunities
which can facilitate the access to preferred jobs, hence, increase the occupational
mobility. Furthermore, this can also be a result of self-selection since naturalized
immigrants are already more mobile even before naturalization.
1.4.2 Naturalization in Germany
There is no explicit variable indicating the time of naturalization in the GSOEP. How-
ever, individuals who acquired the German nationality report a change of nationality.
Hence, this study assumes that the reported change of the nationality is the exact
date of naturalization. Moreover, the 2002 wave includes a question asking migrants
to report the year of their naturalization. This information is exploited to reduce the
measurement error. Figure 1.5 shows the naturalization rates in Germany. The nat-
uralization rate in Germany before the immigration law change in 1990 is very low
(less than 1 percent). The change in the immigration law increases the number of
naturalized immigrants starting from 1991 and has the peak rate in 1995 (around
4 percent). Following the peak in 1995, the naturalization rate shows a decreasing
trend. The initial increase after the law change can be attributed to the fact that Ger-
man descendants coming from ex-Soviet countries obtained the citizenship during
the same period. Furthermore, immigrants who are more committed, motivated, or
expected positive utility applied for the citizenship right after the law change.
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Eligibility for German Citizenship
This paper uses eligibility for German citizenship as an instrument for the naturaliza-
tion because of potential time-variant and -invariant unobserved individual hetero-
geneity. A regression approach that uses the naturalization can overstate the occu-
pational mobility because of the potential positive self selection problem. The citi-
zenship law changes in Germany in 1991 and 2000 allows us to use the eligibility for
German citizenship as an instrument for naturalization.
Eligibility for German citizenship was first introduced in 1991. New citizenship
law introduced requirements of residency and age. For instance, two immigrants
coming to Germany at the same time could have a different eligibility year if one was
younger than the other. Similarly, two immigrants of same age coming to Germany
in different years could have a different eligibility year for citizenship. With the sec-
ond change in the eligibility criteria in 2000, the residency requirement was reduced
from 16 years to 8 years. Thus, some immigrants immediately became eligible in
2000 while others had to satisfy 8 years of residency instead of 16 years. In particular,
a similar strategy to Gathmann et al (2014) for identifying variations in the IV esti-
mation is used. First, immigrants become eligible immediately with the 1991 reform.
Second, immigrants get eligibility status with the 1991 reform in the 1991-1999 re-
form. Third, immigrants become eligible with the 2000 reform immediately. Finally,
immigrants get the eligibility status with the 2000 reform in the 2000-2011. Therefore,
the variation in the eligibility criteria is expected to capture the variation in natural-
ization behavior of immigrants. Regression results from the first stage IV estimation
provides such evidence in the next section.
1.4.3 Control Variables
This paper also takes into account the other observable characteristics. The set of
explanatory variables included in the analysis aims to control for the differences in
occupational mobility among individuals. Table 1.2 reports the descriptive statistics.
The mean age of natives in the sample is 42.0 and for all immigrants 41.3. Even-
tually naturalized immigrants are on average younger (39.3) than non-naturalized
immigrants (41.93). Gender takes the value of 1 if the individual is a male and 0 oth-
erwise. The sample mainly consists of male individuals which constitute around 70
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percent of the sample.
Work experience of respondents is provided by the GSOEP. An important note
is that naturalized immigrants obtain the German citizenship early in their career.
Similar to age, one expects more experienced immigrants to be less mobile since
the job specific training/knowledge is higher for those immigrants. Unfortunately,
the GSOEP does not provide information on job specific experience of individuals
which would allow to check whether occupation-specific experience influences oc-
cupational mobility.
The GSOEP provides different levels of educational attainment. The average years
of education is higher among naturalized immigrants (11.66) than non-naturalized
immigrants (10.14). The empirical analysis uses five levels; no degree, elementary,
high school, vocational training, and university.
Marital status is constructed with the information provided by the survey. The
variable takes the value 1 if the individual is married and 0 otherwise. Divorced and
widows are included in the single category. One would expect that being married
affects occupational mobility negatively.
Sectors are included in the empirical analysis. Here, the sectors are divided ac-
cording to the 9 different one-digit ISCO-88 code. The categories are Managers, Pro-
fessionals, Technicians, Clerks, Service workers, Agriculture workers, Craft, Opera-
tors, Elementary, and other sectors. Figure 1.6 illustrates the job distribution of na-
tives, eventually naturalized immigrants and non-naturalized immigrants. It is clear
from the figure that naturalized immigrants have more favorable job distribution
than non naturalized immigrants.
Years since migration is calculated by using the year of arrival to Germany. This
variable is also used to calculate the duration of legal residence in Germany. The av-
erage age of arrival for naturalized immigrants is lower than that of non-naturalized
immigrants, which implies that the younger the age of arrival the higher the likeli-
hood to apply for citizenship.
Finally, the country of origin of individuals is included in the survey to check
whether the difference in acquisition of citizenship exists according to different ben-
efits for individuals from different countries. The variable takes the value 1 if the
immigrant is from a non-EU country and 0 otherwise. It is expected that individuals
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from non-EU countries are more likely to naturalize and use citizenship as a tool to
be more mobile in the labor market.
1.5 Estimation Results
The empirical analysis starts with the pooled probit estimation. Table 1.3 reports the
estimation results from the pooled probit model with different specifications where
the coefficient of interest is α1 in equation 1.1. This model is the most appropriate
choice if potential unobserved time-invariant and -variant individual heterogeneity
is ignored. Looking at the table, immigrants who are naturalized German citizens are
more likely to change occupations. In particular, estimation results in the first spec-
ification reveals that naturalized immigrants are 2.5% more likely to change occupa-
tions compared to non-naturalized immigrants with similar socioeconomic charac-
teristics. This reveals that acquisition of German citizenship is associated with an
immediate increase in occupational mobility.
Years since naturalization is included in the further specifications which is pos-
itively associated with occupational mobility but the coefficient is insignificant. It
estimates the average impact of every additional year that passes following the Ger-
man citizenship. Naturalized immigrants are expected to change occupations more
frequently in the first years following naturalization instead of a permenant increase
in occupational mobility. After including years-since-naturalization in the equation,
the coefficient of naturalization drops from 2.5% to 1.9% (column 2) but is still signif-
icant.
The fourth and the fifth columns include the dummy variables indicating the
years after and before naturalization. This set up allows to identify the timing of
higher occupational mobility. Each indicator variable estimates the marginal effect
of i th year after/before naturalization on occupational mobility. Looking at the last
column, coefficient of variables after naturalization are positive and significant in
the sense that after first three years occupational mobility can increase upto 10%.
The last column includes two dummy variables to estimate the occupational mobil-
ity after naturalization. The results report that naturalized immigrants are on average
4.5% more likely to be occupationally more mobile in the first five years. Furthermore,
24
dummy variables are included to allow for higher occupational mobility before natu-
ralization. The estimated coefficients are very small and insignificant which implies
that immigrants do not start changing occupations before obtaining German citizen-
ship. Moreover, naturalization coefficient loses its significance on occupational mo-
bility. The results suggest that naturalization does not increase occupational mobility
immediately, instead, immigrants change their behavior in years following the natu-
ralization and become more mobile in the German labor market.
Further specifications include years since naturalization (column 2) and country
of origin (column 3) to control for individual differences. Ten year of experience de-
creases occupational mobility by 4.3 percent (column 4) which confirms the previous
discussion that increasing occupation-specific human capital lowers the probability
of changing occupations. Another important determinant of occupational mobility
is the experience since naturalization. Results reveal that one year of experience fol-
lowing naturalization is associated with 4% to 9% decrease in occupational mobility.
Immigrants who accumulate occupation-specific human capital after naturalization
are less likely to change occupations. Interestingly, years since migration and educa-
tion are not significantly associated with occupational mobility.
Results reported above can overstate the benefit of naturalization because poten-
tial unobserved individual heterogeneity is neglected. It is well documented that nat-
uralized immigrants are more likely to be positively selected in terms of observable
and unobservable characteristics. An alternative approach is to estimate fixed-effects
models to control for time-invariant unobservable characteristics. The next table
reports the results from fixed effects logit estimate. After controlling for individual
fixed effects, Table 1.4 shows that the coefficient of naturalization is positive and not
significant. The years following naturalization are negatively associated with occu-
pational mobility which is contradictory to the pooled probit results previously pre-
sented. There are two potential channels for different results between two estimation
methods. First, the positive relationship reported by pooled probit model is driven
by the unobserved characteristics of individuals. After controlling for the individual
fixed effects, the relationship between naturalization and occupational mobility is
negative and not significant.
Alternatively, the sample that is estimated with the fixed effects is different than
25
the sample estimated with the pooled data. The fixed effects model estimates the
observations where the dependent variable changes at least once during the observa-
tion period. For instance, individuals who do not change sectors or change sectors
in every period are dropped out from equation 1.1. The number of observations re-
ported at the bottom of each table confirms the different samples used in two esti-
mations such that number of observations decreased from 15,676 to 5,738. To better
understand the reason of the negative relationship between naturalization and occu-
pational mobility, we use the same sample and estimate the probit estimation. Table
1.5 confirms that the relationship years since naturalization and occupational mobil-
ity is negative. Similar to fixed effects estimation coefficient of naturalization is pos-
itive and not significant. This confirms that the contradictory results between fixed
effects and pooled probit estimations is not because of the individual unobserved
characteristics but instead the sample selection for the fixed effects estimation.
According to the previous discussion, although the fixed effects model controls
for individual fixed effects, the estimates are biased because of the sample selec-
tion. Moreover, there can also be time-variant unobservable characteristics associ-
ated with occupational mobility and naturalization. Therefore, this research paper
exploits the instrumental variable approach to identify the relationship between nat-
uralization and occupational mobility.
1.5.1 Evidence from Instrumental Variable Estimation
In this section, the empirical analysis reports the results from two stage IV estima-
tion. As discussed previously, eligibility for German citizenship can be used as an
instrument for naturalization if immigrants are more likely to naturalize when they
are eligible to apply for German citizenship. Table 1.6 reports the results from the
first stage linear probability and the probit estimations of equation 1.3. Looking at
the table, the eligibility criteria are significant and positive in both specifications. An
individual who is eligible for naturalization is between four and eight percent more
likely to obtain the German citizenship compared to non-eligible individuals with
same characteristics. The results confirm the first assumption of two stage IV estima-
tion which requires that instrument to be correlated with naturalization.
Several explanatory variables are also reported in the first stage IV estimation
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which give important insights about the naturalization behavior of immigrants. Ed-
ucational attainment is positively associated with the German citizenship. In partic-
ular, immigrants with university degree are more likely to apply for the host country
citizenship. Men are more likely to obtain the German citizenship than women. Neg-
ative relationship between age and naturalization suggests that immigrants are more
likely to apply citizenship at a younger age.
Table 1.7 reports the results from the 2SPS and 2SLS in equation 1.2 where the
predicted values from equation 1.3 is used instead of naturalization at the second
stage IV estimation. This estimation strategy takes care of the time-invariant and
-variant unobserved heterogeneity by using the exogenous variation stem from the
citizenship law change in Germany. The results reveal that naturalization is positively
associated with occupational mobility. In particular, higher occupational mobility is
not a result of immediate impact of naturalization, instead immigrants change occu-
pations more frequently after naturalization. Each specification includes the dummy
variables indicating the years after and before naturalization to assess the timing of
the impact of naturalization on the occupational mobility of immigrants. The coef-
ficient of years after naturalization is significant and positive in the fourth and fifth
year after naturalization: three years after naturalization occupational mobility can
increase between 6% to 8%. Immigrants with German citizenship do not start chang-
ing occupations prior to naturalization since the year dummies before naturalization
are negative and insignificant, indicating that higher occupational mobility succeeds
German citizenship. Similar to previous estimation, experience since naturalization
still has a negative impact on occupation change such that one year of experience
following naturalization decreases the occupational mobility by 1.5 percent.
Finally, the empirical analysis reports results from the bivariate probit model. The
model differs from the two stage IV model because it is a recursive method where
the error terms are correlated. The results from the bivariate probit estimation are
showed in Table 1.8. First of all, the correlation between the error terms, ρ, reported
at the bottom of the table is insignificant in both specifications. This indicates that
the two error terms are not stronly related. Results depict a similar picture with the
two stage IV estimation. Naturalization is not associated with an immediate increase
in occupational mobility. Immigrants with German citizenship change their behavior
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in the years following the naturalization and become more mobile in the German
labor market.
1.5.2 Naturalization and Occupational Assimilation
Previous results reveal that immigrants change occupations more frequently after ob-
taining the German citizenship. Now, empirical analysis investigates whether natu-
ralization leads to faster occupational assimilation in the labor market. To estimate
the occupational assimilation, upward occupational mobility is defined which indi-
cates whether the occupational change results with a better job. To decide the rank-
ing between the occupations we use the prestige codes giving by ISEI code. ISEI code
is a measure that is created after taking education and income into account to scale
occupations.
Table 1.9 illustrates the averages of three occupational scores on four interested
groups for our analysis. There are three available occupational scores mentioned in
the GSOEP: ISEI, KLAS, and SIOPS. Immigrants are more likely to be employed in
jobs with lower occupational scores compared to natives. It is also documented in
the table that the naturalized immigrants, on average, work in more prestigious jobs
relative to non-naturalized immigrants. Furthermore, Figure 1.6 shows the distribu-
tion of different groups in the German labor market according to ISCO-88 code. The
ranking followed by ISCO-88 code is a general description of sectors which require
more job specific training. For instance, 1 refers to Managers while 9 is Elementary
jobs. It is important to note that the distribution of naturalized immigrants is more
favorable than non-naturalized immigrants. Naturalized immigrants are more likely
to be employed in jobs with higher occupational code compared to non-naturalized
immigrants without controlling of individual characteristics.
The better job distribution of naturalized immigrants can be because of the im-
pact of naturalization to create more job opportunities and easier access to better
jobs. Alternatively, better jobs of naturalized immigrants can be associated with un-
observed individual characteristics independent of naturalization. To estimate the
impact of naturalization on occupational assimilation, upward occupational assim-
ilation is defined which equals to 1 if occupational change results with a better job
and 0 otherwise. Later, the instrumental variable estimation strategy is employed
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where the dependent variable is upward occupational mobility. Table 1.10 reports
the results for the 2SPS, 2SLS and bivariate probit estimation. The results reveal that
naturalization is not associated with an immediate upward occupational assimila-
tion relative to non-naturalized immigrants. The coefficients are insignificant and
different in sign for two estimation methods. Instead, faster assimilation in terms of
occupations and sectors only starts in the years following naturalization. Naturalized
immigrants are on average 3 to 6 percent more likely to move to better jobs compared
to non-naturalized counterparts five years after the naturalization.
1.6 Conclusion
Germany has been an immigrant country with the arrival of guest-workers from dif-
ferent destinations from Europe. Although it has been an immigrant country, Ger-
many was very ignorant with their immigrant communities until 1990. Then, further
steps had taken to improve the integration of those communities with the new immi-
gration law. Under the new law, immigrants had easier access to German citizenship,
which brings additional benefits to immigrants. This article examines whether immi-
grants change their behavior in the labor market after naturalization in Germany. In
particular, we investigate whether immigrants become occupationally more mobile
after naturalization and if the latter leads to better jobs in the labor market.
The empirical analysis from probit estimations reports that naturalization is as-
sociated with higher occupational mobility. However, this model does not take into
consideration self-selection problems. In order to do so, we use the changes in the
immigration law in Germany in 1990s. The law change provides an exogenous vari-
ation in the naturalization process. Hence, we use the eligibility criteria as an in-
strument for the naturalization. This controls for the unobserved heterogeneity both
time-variant and time invariant. The results show that naturalization is not associ-
ated with immediate impact on occupational mobility. Instead, years following the
naturalization event are associated with higher occupational mobility.
The law change in Germany provides easier access to citizenship which results
in better labor market outcomes for the individuals. This is very important for the
policymakers either in the destination or home country. The destination country
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can lower the requirements for citizenship to help the immigrants integrate into the
labor market while the home country can sign dual citizenship agreements with the
destination country to accelerate the labor market integration of their expatriates.
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Figure 1.1: Occupational Mobility in the GSOEP before and after Correction, 1985 - 2011
Source: own calculations GSOEP.
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Table 1.1: Reasons to Naturalize
Important Not Important No statement given
Because I want to
retain all the rights 86.4 12.9 0.7
of a German Citizen
Because I want/wanted
to retain the advantages 85.3 13.0 1.7
of being an EU citizen
Because I have
always lived 83.4 16.6 0.0
here
Because my job opportunities
will be better with 82.3 16.6 1.1
German nationality
Because I
was born 76.4 23.0 0.6
in Germany
Because it is easier to
deal with official bodies 72.6 26.2 1.2
as a German citizen
Because I feel
myself to be rooted 69.1 30.7 0.2
in Germany
Because without German nationality
I will have to apply for a residence 53.4 43.9 2.7
permit in order to remain in Germany
Because I feel
myself to be 53.3 45.9 0.8
a German
Because it is/was
what my family 22.9 76.8 0.3
wanted/wants
Note. Source: The table is taken from The naturalisation behaviour of foreigners in Germany, and findings
concerning Optionspflichtige (persons required to choose between two nationalities) (Blicke et al. 2011)
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Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics
Natives Immigrants Eventually Naturalized Non-Naturalized
Immigrants Immigrants
Age 42.03 41.34 37.75 41.93
(10.554) (10.522) (9.697) (10.535)
Gender .69 .72 .70 .73
(.462) (.447) (.460) (.445)
Years of Education 12.79 10.36 11.66 10.14
(2.675) (2.331) (2.556) (2.219)
Experience 18.86 18.92 14.85 19.60
(10.871) (10.845) (9.721) (10.875)
Married .71 .88 .82 .89
(.454) (.328) (.387) (.316)
Years Since Migration 19.32 17.19 19.669
(10.006) (11.758) (9.639)
Age at Migration 21.10 17.84 21.58
(9.231) (9.695) (9.065)
Observations 121,521 21,031 2,996 18,035
Own Calculations, GSOEP. The reported numbers in the first row are the means of corresponding variables and
standard errors are in the second row in paranthesis.
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Figure 1.2: Occupational Mobility after Correction in Germany, 1985 - 2011
Source: own calculations GSOEP.
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Figure 1.3: Occupational Mobility for Natives and Immigrants in Germany, 1985 - 2011
Source: own calculations GSOEP.
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Figure 1.4: Occupational Mobility for Naturalized and Non-Naturalized Immigrants, 1985 -
2011
Source: own calculations GSOEP. Naturalized immigrants refers to eventually naturalized im-
migrants.
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Figure 1.5: Naturalization Rate in Germany 1981 - 2012
Source: own calculations with data of the Federal Statistical Office of Germany.
Figure 1.6: Occupational Distribution in the GSOEP, 1985-2011
Source: own calculations GSOEP.
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Table 1.3: Probit Estimates for the Pooled Sample, Naturalization on Occupational Mobility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Naturalized 0.0251566 ** 0.0191842 * 0.0204129 * -0.0010635 -0.0012491
0.01033 0.01015 0.01046 0.01427 0.01427
ESN -0.0040113 ** -0.006618 ** -0.0070902 ** -0.0086888 *** -0.0064878 **
0.0018 0.00299 0.00317 0.00331 0.00285
YSN 0.0029251 0.0035344
0.00236 0.00255
N att+1 0.0127018
0.02432
N att+2 0.0512625
0.03337
N att+3 0.044103
0.03539
N att+4 0.1045898 **
0.05025
N att+5 0.1034518 *
0.05815
N att+1−t+5 0.0450121 *
0.02599
N att>5 0.0842581 0.0607917
0.05239 0.04302
N att−1 0.0275341 0.0273871
0.01862 0.01863
N att−2 -0.0076447 -0.0076966
0.01458 0.01461
N att−3 0.001844 0.0017989
0.01631 0.01633
Age 0.0005674 0.0005502 0.0005391 0.000538 0.0005394
0.00039 0.00039 0.00039 0.00039 0.00039
Gender -0.0146072 *** -0.0145729 *** -0.0150712 *** -0.0151892 *** -0.0152122 ***
0.00491 0.00491 0.00496 0.00494 0.00495
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Table 1.3 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Experience -0.0042728 *** -0.0042321 *** -0.0042767 *** -0.0042546 *** -0.0042816 ***
0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
Elementary -0.0069582 -0.0067074 -0.0072842 -0.0070511 -0.0074723
0.00886 0.00886 0.00885 0.00884 0.00884
High School -0.0216492 *** -0.0213395 *** -0.0221663 *** -0.0219957 *** -0.0223705 ***
0.00774 0.00778 0.00765 0.00767 0.00763
Vocational -0.007673 -0.0074942 -0.0076522 -0.0075107 -0.0079121
0.00985 0.00988 0.00988 0.00988 0.00982
University -0.0127829 -0.0130131 -0.015444 * -0.0152879 * -0.0155477 *
0.00895 0.00896 0.00866 0.00868 0.00862
YSM 0.0000498 0.0000373 0.0000567 0.0000591 0.0000711
0.00023 0.00024 0.00024 0.00024 0.00024
Controlled for
Period dummy X X X X X
Country of Origin X X X X X
Number of Observations 15,676 15,676 15,676 15,676 15,676
Psuedo R2 0.0636 0.0639 0.0650 0.0667 0.0657
Note. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%. The reported numbers are the marginal
coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Note. The dependent variable is the occupational mobility. N atur l i zedt+/−i is a dummy variable referring to i
years before/after naturalization year, thus, is equal to 1 if survey year is equal to N atur l i zedt+/−i and 0
otherwise.
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Table 1.4: Fixed Effects Logit Estimates, Naturalization on Occupational Mobility
(1) (2) (3)
Gender*Age .0669343 *** .067565 *** .0702149 ***
( .0172259 ) ( .0173558) ( .0174407)
No degree*Experience -.4346559 *** -.4342062 *** -.4405752 ***
(.0828653) ( .0828872 ) ( .0838127)
Elementary*Experience -.3065978 *** -.3058349 *** -.3105609 ***
(.0339758) (.0340888) ( .0343182)
High School*Experience -.2761162 *** -.2750236 *** -.2824762 ***
(.0402133) ( .0403862 ) ( .0406719)
High School+Voc*Experience -.2945583 *** -.2923855 *** -.294476 ***
(.0478025) ( .0483092 ) ( .0487851)
University*Experience -.2407138 *** -.238484 *** -.2461724 ***
(.041974) ( .0426008) (.0431261)
YSM .1002312 *** .099484 *** .0988701 ***
(.0240769) ( .0242197) (.0244035)
Naturalized .1140096 .1428098 .140429
(.2132268) ( .2308138 ) ( .2321622 )
Years Since Naturalization -.0115054 -.0149538
( .035961 ) ( .0362474)
Controlled for
Sector X X X
Number of Observations 5,738 5,738 5,738
Log-likelihood -1578.3166 -1578.2652 -1568.5005
Note. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
Note. The dependent variable is the occupational mobility. The reported numbers are the coefficients, not the
marginal effects. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 1.5: Pooled Probit Estimates with Fixed Effects Sample, Naturalization on Occupational
Mobility
(1) (2) (3)
Gender*Age .0001041 .000117 .000033
( .00024) ( .00024 ) ( .00025)
No degree*Experience -.0035826 *** -.0035713 *** -.0032161 ***
( .00109) ( .00109) ( .00105)
Elementary*Experience -.0062265 *** -.0061562 *** -.0059198 ***
( .00063) (.00063) ( .00065)
High School*Experience -.0082856 *** -.0082608 *** -.0081024 ***
(.00107) ( .00107) (.00106)
High School+Voc*Experience -.0068895 *** -.0067157 *** -.0067045 ***
( .001) ( .00099) ( .00102)
University*Experience -.0053474 *** -.0051235 *** -.0050622 ***
( .00104) ( .00103) ( .00108)
YSM -.0002687 -.0002576 -.0003087
(.00049) ( .0005) ( .0005)
Naturalized -.0301132 ** .00537 .0056125
( .01222) ( .021) ( .02114)
Years Since Naturalization -.0074119 ** -.007437 *
( .00323 ) ( .00321)
Controlled for
Sector X X X
Number of Observations 5,738 5,738 5,738
Psuedo R2 0.0287 0.0297 0.0319
Note. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
Note. The dependent variable is the occupational mobility. The reported numbers are the marginal coefficients.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 1.6: First Stage IV Estimation, First Stage IV
Linear Probability Probit
Eligible 0.0762738 *** 0.0362452 ***
0.0134381 0.00602
Age -0.0017529 * -0.001272
0.0010405 0.00083
Gender 0.008432 ** 0.0057543
0.0153606 0.00946
Experience 0.0007832 *** 0.0004476
0.0009965 0.00079
Elementary 0.013386 ** 0.026147
0.0125159 0.01752
High School 0.0425193 ** 0.0600665 *
0.0212569 0.03423
Vocational 0.0472914 * 0.0682446
0.0280618 0.0422
University 0.0935384 *** 0.1095046 **
0.0303297 0.04856
YSM 0.0000359 0.0000576
0.0009693 0.00051
Controlled for
Time Period Dummies X X
Country of Origin X X
Number of Observation 15,676 15,676
R2 0.1590 0.2379
F-statistic F( 19, 2442) = 16.01 Wald chi2(19) = 407.43
Note. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
Note. The dependent variable is naturalization. First stage IV in equation 1.3 is estimated. The reported numbers
in the probit estimation in the first column are marginal effects. Standard errors are in parentheses.
46
Table 1.7: Probit Estimates for the Pooled Sample, Second Stage IV
2SLS 2SPS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Naturalized 0.1349025 0.1364651 -0.0156666 -0.0149486
0.1262265 0.1262975 0.0379 0.03789
Experience Since Naturalization -0.023869 *** -0.0196094 ** -0.0131499 * -0.0099552
0.0088506 0.0082516 0.00706 0.00654
N att+1 0.0080612 0.0065047
0.0262519 0.02253
N att+2 0.0426209 0.0355653
0.0283617 0.02864
N att+3 0.0295984 0.0241519
0.0285374 0.02833
N att+4 0.0756944 ** 0.0706566 *
0.0339203 0.03979
N att+5 0.0643722 * 0.0653732
0.0358654 0.04368
N att+1−t+5 0.0381764 * 0.0321946
0.0216414 0.02258
N att>5 0.0480857 0.0402285 0.0366847 0.0287494
0.0297801 0.0287704 0.03126 0.02878
N att−1 0.0354262 0.0354232 0.0294705 0.0294879
0.0271157 0.0271098 0.02605 0.02607
N att−2 -0.0088559 -0.0088066 -0.0065773 -0.0065208
0.0251089 0.0251063 0.01902 0.01907
N att−3 0.005411 0.0054121 0.0032103 0.0032449
0.0256141 0.0256096 0.0209 0.02093
Age 0.0008458 0.0008421 0.0005274 0.0005275
0.0005443 0.0005443 0.00039 0.00039
Gender -0.01924 *** -0.0192437 *** -0.0150268 *** -0.0150651***
0.0058862 0.00589 0.00498 0.00499
Experience -0.0043647 *** -0.0043626 *** -0.0043206 *** -0.0043292***
0.0004946 0.0004946 0.0004 0.0004
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Table 1.7 Continued
2SLS 2SPS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Elementary -0.0120973 -0.0122751 -0.0074327 -0.0076698
0.0088455 0.0088373 0.00886 0.00886
High School -0.0360668 *** -0.0364465 *** -0.0217386 *** -0.0220426***
0.0116767 0.0116716 0.00781 0.00778
Vocational -0.0170073 -0.0173687 -0.0074508 -0.0076982
0.0146866 0.0146879 0.01006 0.01003
University -0.0333624 * -0.0338875 ** -0.0142098 -0.0144791
0.0170924 0.0170797 0.00918 0.00914
YSM -0.0001106 -0.0001082 0.0000825 0.0000891
0.0003147 0.0003151 0.00024 0.00024
Controlled for
Time Period Dummies X X X X
Country of Origin X X X X
Number of Observation 15,676 15,676 15,676 15,676
R2 0.0295 0.0290 0.0658 0.0651
Note. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%. Second stage IV in equation 1.2 is estimated.
Reported numbers are the marginal effects. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Note. The dependent variable is the occupational mobility. N atur l i zedt+/−i is a dummy variable referring to i
years before/after naturalization year, thus, is equal to 1 if survey year is equal to N atur l i zedt+/−i and 0
otherwise.
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Table 1.8: Bivariate Probit Estimates on Occupational Mobility
(1) (2)
First Stage Biprobit Second Stage Biprobit First Stage Biprobit Second Stage Biprobit
Eligible 0.0362473 *** 0.0362454 ***
0.00602 0.00602
Naturalized -0.0198472 -0.0145255
0.02656 0.03008
Experience Since Naturalization -0.0086743 *** -0.006447 **
0.00331 0.00286
N att+1 0.0134275
0.02446
N att+2 0.053016
0.03353
N att+3 0.0460436
0.03561
N att+4 0.108248 **
0.05041
N att+5 0.1072792 *
0.05862
N att>5 0.0893127 ** 0.0635412
0.05265 0.04308
N att+1−t+5 0.0461627 *
0.02596
N att−1 0.0277424 0.0275175
0.01864 0.01865
N att−2 -0.0077265 -0.0077491
0.01459 0.01461
N att−3 0.0017289 0.0017172
0.01631 0.01633
Age -0.001311 0.0004986 -0.0012988 0.0005131
0.00086 0.00039 0.00086 0.00039
Gender 0.0057093 -0.0149382 *** 0.0057248 -0.0150381 ***
0.00945 0.00499 0.00946 0.00499
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Table 1.8 Continued
(1) (2)
First Stage Biprobit Second Stage Biprobit First Stage Biprobit Second Stage Biprobit
Experience 0.0004816 -0.0042452 *** 0.0004713 -0.0042737 ***
0.00081 0.0004 0.00081 0.0004
Elementary 0.0259911 -0.0065868 0.026068 -0.0071737
0.01752 0.0089 0.01752 0.00889
High School 0.0599673 * -0.021132 *** 0.0600545 * -0.0217988 ***
0.03419 0.00795 0.03422 0.00786
Vocational 0.0677876 -0.0064334 0.0679943 -0.0072052
0.04212 0.0103 0.04217 0.01015
University 0.1093861 ** -0.013615 0.1094999 ** -0.0144393
0.04854 0.00939 0.04857 0.00925
YSM 0.0000644 0.0000725 0.0000621 0.0000801
0.00051 0.00024 0.00051 0.00024
Controlled for
Time Dummies X X X X
Country of Origin X X X X
Number of Observations 15,676 15,676
Rho(ρ) .1048833 .0708451
Loglikelihood -7463.9737 -7468.1013
Note. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%. The system of equations in equation 1.4 and
1.5 are estimated. Reported numbers are the marginal effects. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Note. The dependent variable is given at the top of each column. N atur l i zedt+/−i is a dummy variable referring
to i years before/after naturalization year, thus, is equal to 1 if survey year is equal to N atur l i zedt+/−i and 0
otherwise.
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Table 1.9: Average Occupational Scores
Natives Immigrants Non-Naturalized Naturalized
Immigrants Immigrants
ISEI 44.092 33.76 33.25 36.89
(10.767) (1.0285) (12.937) (11.712)
KLAS 59.605 42.672 41.76 48.32
(24.884) (15.877) (14.611) (21.304)
SIOPS 42.77 35.30 34.91 37.72
(12.108) (10.365) (10.123) (11.461)
The number in the first row is the mean, the number in the second row in parenthesis is the standard deviation.
Source: GSOEP, own calculations.
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Table 1.10: Pooled Sample Probit Estimates on Occupational Mobility, Two Stage IV and Bi-
variate Probit Estimation
2SPS 2SLS Bivariate Probit Estimation
Naturalized 0.0027902 -0.0071264 -0.0037156
0.01911 0.0799849 0.01322
Experience Since Naturalization -0.0133952 *** -0.0187266 *** -0.0063271 ***
0.00382 0.0047958 0.00152
N att+1−t+5 0.0156681 0.0206917 0.0282227
0.01432 0.0149954 0.01868
N att>5 0.0280417 0.0327957 * 0.0596771 *
0.02149 0.018605 0.03509
N att−1 -0.0014151 -0.0020512 0.0016656
0.01029 0.0171646 0.00876
N att−2 0.0004863 0.0006861 0.0037506
0.01136 0.0180515 0.00969
N att−3 0.0027488 0.0046754 0.0061005
0.01267 0.0191854 0.0105
Age 0.0001961 0.0001952 0.0001741
0.0002 0.00032 0.0002
Gender -0.0070413 *** -0.0090875 *** -0.0069156 ***
0.00247 0.0032163 0.00245
Experience -0.0015981 *** -0.0016803 *** -0.0015491 ***
0.0002 0.0002815 0.0002
Elementary -0.0071473 -0.0084881 * -0.0066374
0.00444 0.0049487 0.0044
High School -0.0105053 *** -0.0160117 ** -0.0101469 ***
0.00324 0.0067593 0.00327
Vocational -0.0014802 0.0008894 -0.0007924
0.00484 0.0088234 0.00497
University -0.0064472 -0.0069474 -0.0058352
0.00394 0.010169 0.00399
YSM 0.0000164 0.0000207 0.000016
0.00011 0.0001637 0.00011
Controlled for
Time Period Dummies X X X
Country of Origin X X X
Number of Observations=15,676
Note. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
Note. First column reports the results from equation 1.2 and the second column reports the results from the
estimation of equation 1.4. Reported numbers are the marginal effects. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Note. The dependent variable is the upward occupational mobility. N atur l i zedt+/−i is a dummy variable
referring to i years before/after naturalization year, thus, is equal to 1 if survey year is equal to N atur l i zedt+/−i
and 0 otherwise.
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Chapter 2
BeingMuslim After September 11: An
Evidence From the UK LaborMarket
Metin Nebiler
Abstract
Ethnic discrimination in the workplace is an important obstacle to the integration of
migrant communities in the host countries. This research paper exploits September 11
as an exogenous event to investigate discrimination against immigrants from Muslim
countries in the UK labor market. In particular, the article explores whether September
11 decreased the exit rate from unemployment among immigrants from Muslim coun-
tries in the UK labor market. Empirical analysis exploits discrete time duration models
where results from semi-parametric and parametric duration models are reported. More-
over, channels of discriminatory behavior in the UK labor market are also investigated in
this research paper. Results show that the exit rate from unemployment decreases af-
ter September 11 terrorist attacks for immigrants from Muslim countries compared to
UK-born white population with similar socioeconomic characteristics. There is no evi-
dence for discrimination against immigrants who work in more visible sectors. Although
a significant increase in the unemployment spell is found for the first generation immi-
grants from Muslim countries, no impact is found with regard to second generation im-
migrants.
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2.1 Introduction
The integration of immigrants from Muslim countries in the UK has been debated for
several decades. It is widely discussed that those immigrants experience disadvan-
tage in the labor market compared to other communities (Shields and Price, 2003).
The relevant discourse reached its peak after the terrorist attacks of September 11 and
the London bombings, following which Western governments grew sceptical towards
immigrants from Muslim countries. Since then, a number of reports have shown that
there is an increasing violence and discrimination towards those immigrant groups
in social life. When it comes to discussing discrimination in the labor market how-
ever, the results appear vague. This research paper exploits September 11 as an ex-
ogenous event to investigate the discrimination in the UK labor market against im-
migrants from Muslim countries. In particular, I study whether negative attitudes
after September 11 decreased the exit rate from unemployment to paid employment
of those immigrants in the UK labor market.
Several studies report increasing discrimination and violence against immigrants
from Muslim countries after the September 11 terrorist attacks. Negative attitudes
against Muslim immigrants were higher in the United States (Saroglu and Galand,
2004). Those individuals experienced 1,700 percent more hate crimes from 2000 to
2001 (Anderson, 2002). Almost one third of American Muslims have pointed out neg-
ative attitudes as a primary problem while 20 percent refer to discrimination and
prejudice (US Department of Justice, 2011). Similar cases of discrimination and vio-
lence were observed in the UK after the terrorist attacks (Sheridan and Gillett, 2005).
Sheridan (2006) describes a significant increase (76.3%) in discriminatory behavior
against Muslims. It has also been reported that hate crimes did not only take place
in the UK but also in other parts of Europe (Allen and Nielsen 2002). The main target
group of hate crimes were individuals associated with Muslim stereotypes such as
women wearing veil, men with beards and turbans, etc. even if they were not Mus-
lims (Lambert and Githens-Mazer 2010). Although many reports document discrim-
ination in social life,this does not necessarily reflect discrimination in the labor mar-
ket. Considering terrorist attacks as a negative signal on immigrants from Muslim
countries, discrimination exists if employers change their preferences towards those
immigrants. It is also possible that preferences of employers are not influenced by
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the terrorist attacks, in which case no link would exist among labor market outcomes
of those migrant groups and terrorist attacks.
Empirical studies depict an unclear picture between September 11 and labor mar-
ket outcomes of individuals from Muslim countries. Kaushal et al. (2007) show that
wages of Arab and Muslim men decreased between nine and eleven percent in the
US after the September 11 attacks although no impact was found on the employ-
ment rate of those immigrants. Rabby and Rodgers (2009) argue that labor market
outcomes of young Muslims decreased shortly after the terrorist attacks in the US.
Braakman (2007) finds however no evidence of decrease int the wages of Muslim
workers in the UK. Similarly, Aslund and Rooth (2005) document that September 11
attacks are not associated with any negative impact on the labor market outcomes of
Muslim minorities in Sweden.
The present research paper investigates the impact of the September 11 terrorist
attacks on the unemployment spells of immigrants from Muslim countries. Previ-
ous studies generally focus on the impact of those terrorist attacks on employment
or wages. However, it can be difficult to observe the impact of the terrorist attacks
on wages or unemployment rates since employers cannot fire their employees or
lower their wages on such a ground. In addition, employers (or co-workers) are often
already well acquainted with their current employees (or colleagues) from Muslim
countries. Instead, employers might be hesitant to hire new workers from Muslim
countries. The exit rate from unemployment can therefore be lower and the time
spent on job search longer than before. Evidence from several countries shows that
this kind of discrimination exists in the national labor market towards different com-
munities. For instance, Bertrand et al. (2003) analyze the impact of discrimination
in the labor market on the basis of an experiment carried out in Boston and Chicago.
The authors sent two identical resumes with traditional African American and Cau-
casian names. They found that the return rate for African Americans were 53 percent
less than the other group. A similar experiment was conducted in France in 2010
where individuals with traditional Muslim names had 2.5 times less positive returns
compared to individuals with traditional French names (Adida et al. 2010). Although
such studies are not necessarily related to the September 11 terrorist attacks, their
outcomes confirm that discriminatory behavior based on ethnic background does
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exist in the labor market.
The September 11 terrorist attacks allow us to identify their impact on the labor
market outcomes since terrorist attacks are exogenous, sudden and do not correlate
with any individual characteristics of nationals from Muslim countries. A difference-
in-difference method (DD) is used in order to identify the impact of September 11.
The target group comprises individuals from two Muslim countries in the UK; Pak-
istan and Bangladesh. Religion is not used as a category variable. It is assumed that if
there is discrimination in the labor market, it should be against individuals who are
associated with Muslim stereotypes. Discrete time duration models are employed in
the empirical analysis by using a household survey from the UK, a country with a big
community of Muslim immigrants. The data include information on unemployment
spells and the ethnic background of individuals, which allow us to investigate the
impact of September 11.
Furthermore, channels of discriminatory behavior in the UK labor market are
also investigated in the present research paper. It is widely assumed that the main
target of discriminatory behavior are individuals who are associated with Muslim
stereotypes, even if those individuals are not followers of Islam. If this is true, im-
migrants who are more "visible" should be running a higher risk of being subjected
to discrimination compared to others. This is a further question that the empirical
analysis investigates by identifying two channels of discrimination. First, first gener-
ation immigrants are more traditional, tend to keep their original names, are more
likely to have accent and dress in line with their dogma; they are thus "more visible"
to employers. This is the first channel of discrimination investigated in the empirical
analysis, namely whether first generation immigrants are more likely be subjected to
discriminatory behavior. Second, individuals who work in sectors which are more
visible to customers are assumed to be more "visible" Muslims. This is the second
channel of discriminatory behavior that the empirical part explores, namely whether
discriminatory behavior is higher in those sectors against immigrants from Muslim
countries.
To outline our results briefly, exit rate from unemployment to paid employment
decreases after September 11 terrorist attacks for immigrants from Muslim countries
compared to UK-born white population with similar socioeconomic characteristics.
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However, a smaller effect is observed compared to non-UK born immigrants. Fur-
thermore, a significant increase on the unemployment spell is found for the first gen-
eration immigrants from Muslim countries while no impact is found on the second
generation immigrants. Finally, no evidence is found for enhanced discrimination
against immigrants who work in more visible sectors. Overall, I conclude that the
September 11 terrorist attacks significantly decrease the exit from unemployment of
first generation immigrants from Muslim countries compared to UK-born white pop-
ulation even after controlling for individual characteristics.
The current study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, exit
from unemployment into employment is studied in this research paper, since it can
be difficult to observe the impact of terrorist attacks on wages or employment rates.
Instead, we expect to observe a significant effect, if there is any, in the exit rate from
unemployment. Second, I explore whether the terrorist attacks have had an impact
on labor market outcomes of immigrants from Muslim countries in the UK. There are
several works similar to ours that study the effect of terrorist attacks in the US. This pa-
per is among the few attempts to study the effects in the UK. Finally, two channels of
discrimination are analyzed in the empirical part putting thus into test a hypothesis
that has never been investigated before, namely that visible immigrants from Muslim
countries are more exposed to discrimination in the labor market than others.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 will represent the theoretical frame-
work. The next section will discuss the empirical methodology while section 2.4 will
describe the data. Section 2.5 will present the results.The robustness of the results
will be reviewed in Section 2.6. The last section then discusses the results and con-
cludes.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework in this article relies on the exit rate defined in the job
search model by Mortensen (1986). Consider the exit rate from unemployment
θ =λ(s)(1−F (w∗)) (2.1)
where θ is the exit rate from unemployment, λ(s) is the arrival of job offers which is a
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function of search intensity (s), and (1−F (w∗)) is the probability that a wage offer w
is higher than the reservation wage w∗ (Aslund and Rooth 2005).
The September 11 terrorist attacks can be considered as a negative signal on im-
migrants from Islamic countries in the UK. This can be introduced into the model in
several ways. First, September 11 might change preferences of employers that can
make them more hesitant to hire immigrants from Muslim countries. Similarly, the
terrorist attacks might also change preferences of customers. Even if preferences of
employers do not change, they can still be hesitant to offer jobs to those immigrants
because of customers’ changing preferences. Second, instead of a direct effect on
employers’ preferences,the negative signal after September 11 can increase the sta-
tistical discrimination. In that case, observed average productivity of Muslims can
be lower than other groups which in its turn leads to lower exit rates from unem-
ployment (Fryer, 2011). Finally, discrimination can increase the search costs for im-
migrants from Muslim countries, which can decrease their exit from unemployment
under plausible assumptions (Aslund and Rooth, 2005). Following Aslund and Rooth
(2005), if discrimination exists in the UK labor market after the September 11 terror-
ist attacks, it is assumed that it is most likely to be based on changing preferences of
employers. If immigrants from Muslim countries are less likely to receive job offers
due to discrimination, exit from unemployment will be lower ( dθdλ > 0).
The job arrival function of other ethnic communities is assumed to be unchanged
after the September 11 terrorist attacks1. Discrimination theory predicts that the dif-
ference of arrival functions among ethnic groups is assumed to arise from the asso-
ciation with Muslim stereotypes. Therefore, if discrimination exists in the UK labor
market, it is against individuals who are associated with Muslim stereotypes instead
of only the followers of Islam. Thus, it is assumed that immigrants from Pakistan
and Bangladesh are the treated group. Immigrants of other ethnic origin who are not
associated with Muslim stereotypes are assumed not to be affected by the negative
impact of terrorist attacks and are used as control groups. The empirical analysis in
the paper exploits two control groups in the UK labor market, which are the UK- born
white population and the non-UK born white immigrants.
1It is possible that other groups job arrival function is affected from the terrorist attacks. Since there is a job
to be offered to someone, other minority groups can be positively affected by the terrorist attacks. In that case,
other minority groups do not form a proper control group, since the effect can be doubled.
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The impact of the terrorist attacks can also vary within ethnic groups that are
associated with the Muslim stereotypes. As reported widely, the main target of dis-
crimination were individuals who were more visible in the public sphere. Thus, if
discrimination in the labor market is similar to discrimination in the public sphere,
it is expected that discriminatory behavior is higher against more visible immigrants.
A primary channel of discrimination can be based on sectors that are more visible
to customers. In that case, one would expect to observe a stronger negative impact
on exit rates in visible sectors as opposed to other less visible ones, such as manu-
facturing, etc. Second, first generation immigrants can be more visible compared
to second generation immigrants since they are more traditional, tend to keep the
homeland names, dresses or appearances, are less fluent in the host country lan-
guage, etc. Hence, one might expect that the first generation immigrants are more
likely to experience discrimination compared to second generation.
2.3 Empirical Model
The empirical analysis investigates the impact of the September 11 terrorist attacks
on the exit rate from unemployment of immigrants from Muslim countries by using
discrete time duration models. In particular, semi-parametric and parametric mod-
els are estimated to identify the impact of terrorist attacks. In line with the previous
theoretical discussion, if increased discrimination exists in the UK labor market after
the terrorist attacks, a lower rate of exit from unemployment is expected for individu-
als from Islamic countries compared to other groups with similar characteristics.
In the literature, unemployment duration is usually assumed to be a continuous
variable. Nonetheless, it is generally reported in discrete time intervals in most sur-
veys. Assuming that the unemployment duration is continuous while reported in
discrete time intervals can be problematic. Since the unemployment duration in the
data used for this article is reported in large intervals, discrete time duration models
are exploited for the empirical analysis. Several different econometric frameworks
can be relied upon to estimate discrete time unemployment exit. This research pa-
per uses complementary log-log model to investigate the existence of discrimination
in the labor market.
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Consider a random variable T which represents unemployment duration. Contin-
uous time duration models assume that T is continuous (T=(1,T)) and there is only
one exit from unemployment at a time; discrete time models assume that T is a pos-
itive integer (T=1,2,...,T). Individuals enter the sample when they are unemployed
which is the beginning of their unemployment spell, t = 1. Individuals stay in the
sample until they find a job or exit the survey so that no further information is avail-
able. In the case of leaving the survey or labor force before exiting unemployment,
these individuals are censored, which is assumed to be uncorrelated with the depen-
dent variable.
Discrete time duration models define the exit from unemployment to employ-
ment for the individual i at time t as follows,
Pi t (T, x)= Pr (Ti = t |Ti ≥ t , x) (2.2)
where Pi t is the probability that individual i exits unemployment at time t, condi-
tional on staying unemployed until time t. Several different approaches assume a
functional form for this relationship2. The complementary log-log model assumes
that hazard rate is given by
Pi t = 1−exp[−exp(h0(t )+βXi t )] (2.3)
where h0(t ) is the baseline hazard function and Xi t is the set of explanatory variables.
The complementary log-log model is the discrete time representation of continuous
time proportional hazard models (Allison 1982). In this model, the baseline hazard
function is the same for every individual where the relative hazard shifts the baseline
hazard according to individual characteristics.
The baseline hazard function can be assumed to have different parametric and
non-parametric forms. Piecewise constant baseline function is a semi-parametric
functional form that is most commonly used in the literature since no assumptions
about the shape are made. This model assumes that hazard rate is constant within
each reported interval while it can vary between intervals3.
2Linear regression assumes the relationship as Pi t = h0(t )+βXi t while a logit model assumes a nonlinear rela-
tionship as follows Pi t = [1+exp(−h0(t )−βXi t )]−1
3In our setting, unemployment spell is grouped into months: 0-3, 4-6, 7-12, 13-24, 25-36, 37-48, 49-60, and
over 61, thus, dummy variables are created accordingly.
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The dependent binary variable, exit from unemployment to employment, takes
value 1 if the individual finds a job and 0 otherwise. In order to estimate the above
model,the sample is reorganized in a way that every survival is treated as a single
observation for all individuals4. Later, observations are pooled to estimate the coeffi-
cients by maximum likelihood. The likelihood function is given by
L =
N∏
i=1
ti+si∏
j=ti
[Pi t ( j , xi )]
δi [1−Pi t ( j , xi )]1−δi (2.4)
where si is the number of time periods individual i is represented in the sample, δi is
the censoring variable which is equal to 1 if the individual exits from unemployment
and zero otherwise, and Pi t is the complementary log-log hazard rate.
A parametric log-time model is also estimated in the empirical part. The log-time
model assumes that hazard rate monotonically changes with time. The hazard rate
is assumed to have the following form
Pi t = 1−exp[−exp((q −1)ln(t )+βXi t )] (2.5)
where q−1 is the log-time parameter and Pi t is the log-time hazard rate. This model
assumes a parametric functional form for duration dependence.
A difference-in-difference estimation method is employed to investigate the im-
pact of the September 11 terrorist attacks. Consider the following model,
h(t ; X )= Xi tβ+h0(t )+Sept11tα1+Musli miα2+Sept11∗t Musli miδ (2.6)
where h(t , X ) = l og [−log (1−Pi t )] is the complementary log log hazard rate, Xi t is
set of characteristics of individual i at time t including age, gender, age left education,
employed sector, region, and dependents at the household. Musli mi is an indicator
variable takes the value 1 if the individual i is from Muslim countries or 0 otherwise,
Sept11t is a dummy variable takes the value of 1 if it is after third quarter in 2001 or
0 otherwise. The dependent variable is exit from unemployment which is a binary
outcome. The interaction term, δ, measures the impact of September 11 on the exit
rate from unemployment of immigrants from Muslim countries.
4For instance, if an individual finds a job in the third period, t = 3, three observations are created for the
individual where the dependent variable is zero for the first two periods and one for the third observation.
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This specification allows us to estimate the change in the exit rate from unem-
ployment after September 11. If any deterioration exists after the terrorist attacks,
one expects the exit rate to be lower (δ < 0) and the unemployment duration to be
longer for those immigrants. The set of explanatory variables is included to explain
the differences among individuals. Independent variables included in equation 2.6
are time-invariant by the construction of the sample5.
The treated group comprises individuals from Muslim countries. The focus of
the empirical part is on two countries, Bangladesh and Pakistan, since over ninety
percent of population in those countries are Muslims. At the same time, immigrants
from those countries are also perceived to be Muslims in the UK. For instance, al-
though Indian immigrants are very similar to those immigrants in terms of visual
characteristics, Indian Muslims constitute a small portion of the population in In-
dia. It is therefore more likely that Indian immigrants are not associated with the
September 11 terrorist attacks, thus, they are not included in the treated group. The
indicator variable Musli m refers to individuals from two Islamic countries (in this
case, Pakistan or Bangladesh). Although some individuals from those countries may
not be followers of Islam, it is assumed that it is not only followers of Islam but also
individuals who are associated with Muslim stereotypes that are affected by the ter-
rorist attacks. Thus, all individuals from those countries are assumed to be treated
by the terrorist attacks. The choice of the comparison group is important in order to
estimate the correct impact of the terrorist attacks. Treated and comparison groups
should have similar characteristics except the treatment variable. It is assumed that
UK-born white population and non-UK born white immigrants are considered to be
untreated and taken as control groups.
2.4 Data
The data used in the empirical analysis stem from the UK Quarterly Labor Force Sur-
vey (QLFS). Starting from 1992, this survey has been conducted on a quarterly basis
according to a rotation system where each household participates for five consecu-
tive quarters and twenty percent of the sample is replaced every quarter. The UK sam-
5As mentioned by Allison, this procedure leads to maximum likelihood estimator for the corresponding model
where it is asymptotically efficient and consistent.
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ple consists of around 57,000 households in each wave, out of which the UK sample
includes around 55,000 households and the Northern Ireland sample around 2,000
households. The data provide information on the duration of unemployment of the
respondents in each wave. The information on ethnic background allows us to iden-
tify different ethnic groups which are classified into 14 different categories. Among
those, we construct five groups which are in our interest; UK born white population,
Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Indian, and non-UK born white immigrants. Since there is
no information on the country of birth of parents, second or further generation im-
migrants cannot be identified separately. For simplicity, all UK-born immigrants are
referred to as second generation from now on.
The empirical part uses waves from 1995 to 2007. The data is reconstructed for
the purpose of the article in a panel format. Individuals are followed for five quarters
until when they either exit from unemployment or from the survey. To measure the
complimentary log-log model, the data are reorganized in a way that every survival or
exit is represented as a separate observation in the sample. For instance, if the individ-
ual exits from unemployment at ti (where i=1,2,3,...), i observations are then created
for this individual where the dependent variable is assigned 1 for the i th period and 0
for the previous i −1 periods. If the individual leaves the survey without exiting from
unemployment, i observations are created where the dependent variable is assigned
0 for all i observations. Finally, the observations are pooled to create the final sample.
The size of the groups in the sample is reported in Table 2.1. Around 88 percent is
composed of UK-born white population while Muslims constitute around 3 percent
of the sample.
2.4.1 Duration of Unemployment
The dependent variable is the exit rate from unemployment which takes value 1 if
the individual exits from unemployment and zero otherwise. The question about
the unemployment spell of individuals is asked in every wave in the QLFS. The vari-
able values are presented in Table 2.2. An important feature of the unemployment
duration variable is that it is estimated in large time intervals. Generally, duration
of unemployment is estimated in days, weeks, or months. Therefore, the time span
reported in the survey allows us to employ a discrete time duration model instead of
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a continuous time duration model.
Complete unemployment spell of some individuals cannot be assessed since they
are observed for only five quarters in the survey. It is possible that those individuals
found a job when they left the survey but it is also possible that they have remained
unemployed for longer time periods. Thus, if the individual leaves the survey before
reporting that the unemployment spell ended, it is referred to as right censored ob-
servation. The unemployment spell observed in the data takes the form t =mi n(t ;8)
where t is the reported unemployment spell.
2.4.2 UK LaborMarket 1995-2010
Before starting the empirical analysis, labor market indicators in the UK are presented.
If the labor market conditions worsen during the same period as the September 11
terrorist attacks, the longer unemployment spell of individuals from Muslim coun-
tries can be driven by this fact instead of the terrorist attacks. Table 2.3 documents
the several economic indicators during the period of 1995-2010 (OECD database).
Looking at the table, labor market in the UK had a positive trend starting from 1995
to 2007. In particular, employment grew around 20 percent from 1995 to 2008 while
the labor force increased 10 percent during the same period. Similarly, unemploy-
ment dropped around 40 percent, from 8.6 percent in 1995 to 4.9 percent in 2005.
The severe impact of the worldwide financial crisis can be seen after 2007.
The above analysis documents that the labor market had a positive trend during
the years of the empirical analysis. Thus, it is less likely that the longer unemploy-
ment spell can be explained by labor market conditions. The sample is restricted
during the period 1995-2007, in order to avoid the effects of the financial crisis.
2.5 Empirical Results
2.5.1 Survivor Functions
The theoretical framework predicts that the unemployment spell of immigrants from
Muslim countries is longer if increased discrimination exists in the UK labor market
after the terrorist attacks. The empirical part first presents descriptive evidence from
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the UK labor market. Survivor functions of the ethnic groups in the sample are il-
lustrated in Figure 2.1 and 2.2. The survival function presents the probability that
individuals stay unemployed at least until time t. It is calculated as follows;
Si =
i∏
j=1
n j −d j
n j
(2.7)
where n j is the number who are at the risk at the beginning of interval t, d j is the
number of failures at interval t. Figure 2.1 contrasts the survivor function for UK-
born white population, immigrants from Muslim countries, Indian immigrants and
non-UK born white immigrants in the period of 1995-2007. Clearly, immigrants from
Muslim countries are more likely to stay unemployed for longer periods compared
to other groups. It is quicker for UK-born white population to exit from unemploy-
ment compared to those immigrants. It is interesting that Indian immigrants and
non-UK born white immigrants display a similar trend as UK-born white population,
with slightly more time spent as unemployed. Difference between ethnic groups can
stem from the low demand of employers against those immigrants in the UK labor
market (Shields and Price, 2003). Or alternatively, the figure reports unconditional
probabilities which can be the reason behind the difference among ethnic groups.
A similar pattern is shown in Figure 2.2 which illustrates the survivor functions
before and after September 11. The figure includes UK-born white population as a
reference group in addition to the survival function of immigrants from Muslim coun-
tries. The empirical analysis focuses on relative change instead of absolute change at
the exit rates. Looking at the graph, the difference before and after September 11 is
very small for immigrants from Muslim countries while there is an improvement for
the UK-born white population, i.e. less time spent on looking for jobs. A decrease
in the survival rate of the UK-born white population is observed after September 11
2001, meaning higher exit rates from unemployment.
Table 2.4 reports a more detailed picture of those groups for each unemployment
spell. The estimates of survival function for two groups before and after the Septem-
ber 11 terrorist attacks, the number of individuals at the beginning of each period,
the number of exits from unemployment to employment and the number of cen-
sored observations are presented in the table.The high number of observations be-
fore September 11 is based on the high number of individuals at the first waves and
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high unemployment rates during this period. Table 2.4 also reports a 95% confidence
interval for the survivor function which shows a significant decrease for the UK-born
white population after September 11 at every level of unemployment spell. This con-
firms the favorable economic conditions in the UK labor market. The same trend is
not observed for immigrants from Muslim countries; instead, the survival function
for the first period is higher and similar to other periods after September 11 for those
groups.
The descriptive analysis provides evidence on the worsening labor market con-
ditions for immigrants from Muslim countries compared to UK-born white popula-
tion. The data report no absolute change in the exit rate from unemployment for
immigrants from Muslim countries. However, it shows that favorable economic con-
ditions did not benefit those immigrants and a decrease in the exit rate compared to
UK born white population is observed. Although survival functions represented in
the table are unconditional probabilities, it provides preliminary evidence. One im-
plication can be that the positive trend in the exit rates (more exits from unemploy-
ment) in the UK labor market never occurred for immigrants from Muslim countries
because of increased discrimination after September 11. It is also possible that the
worsening labor market outcomes of immigrants from Muslim countries might be
associated with socio-economic characteristics. A more detailed regression analysis
is presented in the next section.
2.5.2 Results fromDiscrete Time Proportional HazardModels
This section presents regression analysis from the QLFS to assess the impact of the
September 11 terrorist attacks on unemployment exit rates in the UK labor market.
Semi-parametric and parametric discrete time complementary log-log models with
different baseline hazard functions are employed. The first model reports the re-
sults relying on a piecewise constant baseline hazard and the second one using a
log-time baseline hazard.The results from each specification are reported in Tables
2.5, and 2.6. In each table, the first three columns present results from the estimation
of equation 2.6 with different specifications where the comparison group is the UK-
born white population while the last column uses non-UK born white immigrants as
the control group. Note that the reported results are coefficients and one needs to
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exponentiate the reported coefficients to obtain the hazard rates6. Several explana-
tory variables are included in the regression to control for individual heterogeneity.
In addition to individual characteristics, year and quarter dummies are included to
control for the business cycle effects. The coefficient of interest is the interaction
term (δ in equation 2.6), Musli m∗September 11, which measures the impact of the
September 11 terrorist attacks on unemployment exit rates of individuals from Mus-
lim countries.
Table 2.5 presents the results from the estimation with a piecewise constant base-
line hazard. This specification assumes that exit from unemployment is constant
within the intervals but can change between the intervals. The results in the first
column suggest that there is a significant deterioration for immigrants from Muslim
countries after the the September 11 terrorist attacks in the UK labor market. The
coefficient−0.20 implies that those immigrants are 18% less likely to leave the unem-
ployment compared to UK-born white population with similar socioeconomic char-
acteristics in the UK. The results are robust even after including several explanatory
variables in the second and third column such as the method of applying for jobs and
the region of residence. The results suggest that September 11 has a negative impact
on the labor market outcomes of immigrants from Muslim countries. Lower levels
of exit from unemployment also translates into longer unemployment duration for
those immigrants.
Several explanatory variables are included in the estimation to control for indi-
vidual heterogeneity. Adding more observables enables to capture more of the unob-
served heterogeneity since discrete time duration models assume that Xi tβ explains
the hazard rate perfectly. Comparing the model fit in the first three columns suggests
that the log likelihood statistic improves significantly after including the method of
applying for jobs and the region of residence in the regression7. Men are less likely
to exit from unemployment, which suggests that it is easier for women to find em-
6To obtain the hazard rate , one has to calculate exp(β)−1.
7Table 2.5 presents the log likelihood ratio statistic for each specification. One can compare the fit of the
model by employing a simple log likelihood ratio test. The null hypothesis that models are the same can be
tested by comparing the difference between log likelihood statistics which has a chi square distribution. For
instance, difference between first and second specification is 53.3 which is above the critical value of the 0.01
level of significance with 17 degrees of freedom.
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ployment compared to men. As regards age, older workers spend more time as un-
employed compared to their younger counterparts (Bover et al. 2002). This can be ex-
plained by the fact that young employees change jobs more frequently to find better
a job/firm match compared to older workers. Similarly, years since migration have a
similar impact on the exit rate such that when entered the host country, immigrants
are more likely to find a job.
Results also show that education is positively associated with the exit rate from
unemployment. The data contain information with regard to the highest level of ed-
ucational qualification, however, this variable is problematic. Since the educational
system in the UK and the one in the immigrants’ home countries vary significantly,
the educational level is usually reported as ’other qualifications’ for immigrants in
the data. Thus, the age at which the migrant left education is used as a proxy for edu-
cational attainment, which allows us to estimate the impact of education on the exit
rate.
Several other variables which are associated with exit rates are included in the es-
timation. In particular, having dependent children at home increases the exit rate
from unemployment. As expected annual unemployment rate is negatively associ-
ated with the exit rate. Furthermore,the period after September 11 is associated with
quicker exit from unemployment.
Model 4 uses non-UK born white immigrants in the UK labor market as a com-
parison group instead of UK-born white population. The choice of the comparison
group is important in order to estimate the impact of the terrorist attacks more ac-
curately, since a misspecification of the comparison group can give wrong results.
One possible reason of the significance shown in Table 2.5 can be driven from differ-
ences between two groups that are not controlled in the regression. Thus, we report
the results in the last column to check whether the impact is robust for other com-
parison groups. Immigrants from Muslim countries experience disadvantage in the
labor market compared to non-UK born white immigrants. However, the coefficient
is smaller and insignificant. This can suggest that the favorable economic conditions
reported in Table 2.3 can lead to higher exit rates for natives compared to all immi-
grants in the UK labor market. Immigrants from Muslim countries experienced a
decrease in the exit rate compared to both UK-born white and non UK-born white
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populations.
Estimation results from a model with a log-time baseline hazard function is pre-
sented in Table 2.6. This specification assumes that duration is time-dependent in
a way that unemployment exit rate changes monotonically in time. The model with
the log-time baseline hazard function gives very similar results. In particular, the
coefficient on the interaction term is similar to the piecewise constant specification.
For each estimation in Tables 2.5 and 2.6, test statistics are reported at the bottom
of the table. They show that the semi-parametric piecewise constant baseline haz-
ard model has a slightly lower log likelihood. The empirical analysis uses thus this
specification for further estimations.
The evidence from the regression analysis above confirms that discrimination
against immigrants from Muslim countries exists in the UK labor market after the
September 11 terrorist attacks compared to UK-born white population in the sense
that employers are more hesitant to hire those immigrants. The coefficients are ro-
bust even after controlling for socio-economic characteristics and economic indica-
tors in the UK labor market.
2.5.3 Channels of Discrimination
On this basis, we can further discuss one possible channel of discrimination; visibility.
Scholars argue that immigrants from Muslim countries who are more visible in the
public sphere are exposed to discrimination more than others in social life (Lambert
and Githens-Mazer 2010). Thus, it is investigated in this section whether this is also
the case in the labor market. Visibility is defined as a concept of more recognizable
individuals. First, it is possible that immigrants who work in certain sectors are more
visible to the public, for instance hotels, restaurants, wholesale, or retail sectors. Typ-
ically, those immigrants are more visible to customers, which can make employers
more hesitant to hire them. Second, we assume that first generation immigrants are
more visible compared to second generation immigrants since they are more likely
to be traditional, speak English less fluently, keep their homeland names and dresses
etc.
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Discrimination in Visible Sectors
This section investigates whether the degree of discrimination varies across sectors.
Table 2.7 reports the distribution of sectors for each ethnic group in the UK labor
market. Immigrants from Muslim countries are mainly employed in manufacturing,
wholesale, hotels, and restaurants while the distribution of UK-born white popula-
tion across sectors is more balanced. An important concern of the data is the percent-
age of missing sectors which constitutes around one third of the sample. For practical
reasons, sectors are further grouped into four larger groups which are primary, sec-
ondary, tertiary, and missing sectors8. Sectoral differences between ethnic groups
can bias the results if some sectors are affected more by the the September 11 ter-
rorist attacks. If immigrants from Muslim countries work in those sectors, previous
results can be due to worsening in those sectors instead of increased discrimination
in the labor market.
Table 2.8 reports the results from the estimation of equation 2.6. The first col-
umn includes interaction terms to estimate the exit rates of immigrants from Muslim
countries in different sectors. The results indicate that the exit rate of immigrants
from Muslim countries does not differ across the different sectors. The coefficients
of the interaction terms between sectors and the indicator variable Musli m are pos-
itive and insignificant. The second column includes further interaction terms to cap-
ture the impact of September 11 on different sectors. Individuals working in the sec-
ondary and tertiary sector have lower exit rates after the September 11 terrorist at-
tacks compared to their counterparts in the primary sector. One implication of these
results can be that the impact of September 11 on immigrants from Muslim countries
is ascribed to the employment of those immigrants in sectors where the exit rates are
in general lower after September 11. If this statement were true, the effect of discrim-
ination in the labor market can be overstated. To check this, three interaction terms
are included in the third column to identify the impact of September 11 on Muslims
in different sectors. Looking at the table, although coefficients are not significant, the
8The sectors are regrouped according to their degree of visibility. The primary group includes sectors of Agri-
culture, Fishing, Mining, Manufacturing and Electricity, Construction; the second group consists of Wholesale
and Hotels; the tertiary group comprises Transport, Financial Intermediation, Real Estate, Public Administration,
Education, Health, Other Community, Private Households, Extra-territorial.
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exit rate of immigrants from Muslim countries in the secondary and tertiary sectors
increased after September 11. Thus, we can conclude that the observed discrimina-
tion in the UK labor market is not due to sectoral difference.
Furthermore, the last column in Table 2.8 restricts the sample to only secondary
and tertiary sectors. It is possible that immigrants who are working in more visible
sectors are more likely to be exposed to discriminatory behavior. This type of discrim-
ination can be based on customer discrimination which assumes that customers do
not want to have contact with immigrants from Muslim countries or that employers
in customer-related sectors are more hesitant to hire those immigrants even in the
absence of customer discrimination. Thus, sectoral visibility is defined here with ref-
erence to customer interaction, in the sense that sectors with a higher interaction are
considered as more ’visible’. If discrimination is stronger in visible sectors, a signifi-
cantly higher coefficient is expected in those sectors. Results in the last column give
evidence of discrimination based on visibility in the labor market. The coefficient
of the interaction term in the restricted sample is similar to the unrestricted sample
in Table 2.5. This suggests that discrimination does not differ according to sectoral
visibility.
Discrimination against First Generation
Another channel of discrimination based on visibility relates to the migration back-
ground of the immigrants. It is assumed that first generation immigrants are more
visible compared to second generation immigrants because they tend to be more tra-
ditional, keep the homeland names, dresses or appearances, are less fluent in the
host country language, etc. Table 2.9 presents the distribution of immigrants across
ethnic groups compared to their migration background. First generation immigrants
constitute around 70 percent of the Indian and Muslim ethnic population in the UK
labor market. According to discrimination theory, if visibility is a channel of discrimi-
nation, we expect to see a significant impact of the terrorist attacks on first generation
immigrants.
Table 2.10 reports that the impact is strong and significant on the first generation
of immigrants while the coefficient for the second generation immigrants from Mus-
lim countries is small and not significant. This implies that discrimination in the
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labor market takes place primarily against first generation immigrants from Muslim
countries. The exit from unemployment for first generation immigrants from Muslim
countries can be lower because they are more visible and more likely to be associated
with Muslim stereotypes by employers. The last column reports the results from the
model where the comparison group is the non-UK born white immigrants. The coef-
ficient is still negative but smaller and not significant.
2.6 Robustness Checks
This section provides several issues to check the robustness of the reported results.
Previous results report that exit rates of immigrants from Muslim countries is lower
after the September 11 terrorist attacks compared to the UK-born white population.
Moreover, it is showed that discrimination is not based on sectoral visibility. Those
immigrants who are working in visible sectors are not exposed to discrimination
more than individuals working in other sectors. Instead, it is showed that first-generation
immigrants experience discrimination while no impact of September 11 is observed
in the unemployment exit rate of second generation immigrants from Muslim coun-
tries. There are several issues that the empirical analysis has to take into considera-
tion to check the robustness of the results.
2.6.1 Indian Immigrants
It is important to distinguish whether discrimination in the labor market is based on
appearance or country of origin. To check, equation 2.6 is estimated by including im-
migrants from India who are very similar to Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants
in terms of appearance. Although they have similar visual characteristics, Indian im-
migrants are mostly followers of Hindu religion, are more educated, and do not have
traditional Islamic names, dresses, veil, or beard which are associated with Muslim
stereotypes. If discrimination is based on appearance, one could expect a similar im-
pact on exit rates after September 11 on Indian immigrants. On the other hand, if
employers are rational enough to differentiate between those two communities, no
impact on exit rates should be observed.
Table 2.11 reports the results from the estimation of equation 2.6 with a sample
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of UK-born white immigrants, immigrants from Muslim countries, and immigrants
from India. Looking at the table, we see that there is no significant impact as regards
Indian immigrants while the impact is still significant in the case of Muslim immi-
grants. Similarly, Table 2.12 reports the results for the first and second generation
immigrants from Muslim countries and India. Similar to the previous discussion, the
impact on first generation immigrants from Muslim countries still exists while there
is no impact on the first and second generation Indian immigrants compared to the
UK-born white population. This implies that employers are rational enough to differ-
entiate between those two communities. There are thus no changing preferences as
regards immigrants from India that can lead to lower exit rates after September 11.
2.6.2 Different Intervention Dates
Another important issue is the robustness of the results for different intervention
dates. It is possible that the DD estimation strategy employed by the empirical analy-
sis captures an ongoing trend where the relative exit rate from unemployment is neg-
ative for immigrants from Muslim countries. To check whether the results are due
to the September 11 terrorist attacks instead of a negative trend, DD estimates with
different intervention dates are reported in Table 2.13. Looking at the table, interven-
tion dates that are closer to September 11 report significantly lower exit rates. This
suggests that closer intervention dates could still capture the impact of increased dis-
crimination while more remote intervention dates report insignificant coefficients.
The further the intervention dates from September 11, 2001, the higher the isolation
from the impact of increased discrimination. This confirms that the reported results
are a result of the September 11 terrorist attacks instead of a negative trend in the UK
labor market.
2.6.3 Different Comparison Groups
The DD analysis presented here is sensitive to the choice of the comparison group.
An important assumption in DD analysis is that the comparison group is not affected
by the treatment. In addition, the change in the exit rate (conditional on individual
characteristics) would over time be similar for both the comparison group and the
treated group, even in the absence of treatment. This means that any difference in
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the exit rate between the comparison and the treated groups can be attributed to
the impact of the treatment. Until now, the empirical analysis has focused on two
comparison groups, UK-born white population and non UK-born white immigrants
as they are assumed to satisfy the conditions (similar change in the exit rates over
time in the absence of treatment and no influence by the the September 11 terrorist
attacks). Another important advantage of employing the UK-born white population
as a comparison group is the size of the population, which produces more precise
estimates.
Table 2.14 reports the results for different comparison groups. The first two columns
document the estimated coefficients from the previous analysis while the latter columns
present regression results by using different comparison groups. Individuals with
black ethnic background, first generation immigrants from Eastern European coun-
tries9, and immigrants with Asian ethnic background are the comparison groups
that can be identified in the data. Immigrants from Eastern European countries are
the most appropriate comparison group compared to other two immigrant groups.
First, immigrants from Eastern European countries are less likely to be affected by
increased discrimination after the terrorist attacks, since it is less likely that they are
associated with Muslim stereotypes. Second, they work in low level jobs like immi-
grants from Bangladesh and Pakistan. It is also important to note that immigrants
with black and asian ethnic background are much more established in the UK. Equa-
tion 2.6 is estimated by using the original sample in the first row and following the
previous discussion, the sample is restricted to the first generation immigrants in
the second row. Looking at the first row in the table, all coefficients have a negative
sign except for the Asian comparison group. Although the estimated coefficients are
not significant, the negative sign in all specifications confirms the previous discus-
sion, namely that immigrants from Muslim countries have lower exits after the the
September 11 terrorist attacks. When restricting the sample only to the first genera-
tion immigrants (second row in Table 2.14), the estimated effect is stronger, revealing
that the discrimination has been even stronger for the first generation immigrants.
9Immigrants included in the Eastern European comparison group are from the following countries; Cyprus,
Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Greece, former- Yugoslavian countries, Russia,
former-USSR, Belarus, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Moldova, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine
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2.6.4 Unobserved Heterogeneity
An important disadvantage of discrete time models is the unobserved heterogeneity.
Consider the complementary log-log model in equation 2.6,
h(t ; X )= Xi tβ+h0(t ) (2.8)
where h(t ; X ) = l og [−log (1−Pi t )], which does not include an error term, thus does
not control for individual heterogeneity. Discrete time duration models without con-
trolling for unobserved heterogeneity assume that Xi tβ explains the hazard rate per-
fectly which is a very strong assumption. Thus, a regression analysis that does not
control for unobserved heterogeneity can report biased and inconsistent estimates.
One possible method is to include an error term in the above equation which has
zero mean and finite variance. The most common distributional form that is used
in the literature is the gamma distribution which is also the assumption used in this
paper to control for unobserved heterogeneity.
Table 2.15 reports the results from the complementary log-log model with unob-
served heterogeneity. First, the test statistics at the bottom of the table indicate sig-
nificant unobserved heterogeneity. Looking at the table, the results are very similar
to previous results estimated without unobserved heterogeneity. The coefficients on
the interaction terms confirm the previous findings concerning discrimination in the
UK labor market.
2.7 Conclusion
The debate on the integration of Muslim immigrants in the European labor market
has preoccupied scholars for several decades. In this paper, I study the effects of the
September 11 terrorist attacks on the labor market outcomes of Muslim immigrants
in the UK. Interestingly, the impact of such terrorist attacks is a neglected field in
economics. Unlike other papers which studied the situation in the US on wages, this
paper analyzes the effect in European countries with a significant Muslim population.
I contribute to extant literature by analyzing the impact of the September 11 terrorist
attacks on the exit rate from unemployment on grounds that it offers a better basis to
investigate discriminatory behavior in the labor market.
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By using discrete time duration models, I conclude that the unemployment spell
of immigrants from Muslim countries is longer after September 11. Moreover, the
channel of discrimination is investigated by defining two concepts of visibility. It is
well reported in the literature that visible immigrants are exposed to discriminatory
behavior more frequently. The paper argues that there is no evidence confirming
the sectoral discrimination in the UK labor market. Instead, first generation immi-
grants are exposed to discrimination after September 11 while the same effect is not
observed for second generation immigrants from Muslim countries. This suggests
that first generation immigrants are more exposed to discrimination since they are
more visible.
This paper is among the first attempts to investigate the effects of terrorist attacks
on unemployment spells in Western European countries. Discrimination has been
observed not only in social life but also in the workplace in the aftermath of terrorist
attacks. It is therefore of increased significance to investigate the labor market effects
of terrorist attacks in terms of anti-discrimination policymaking.
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Table 2.1: Sample Size of Selected Groups
Ethnicity Observations Perc. No. of Indv. Perc.
UK-born White 198,395 90.16 75,791 89.98
Imm. from Muslim Countries 6,108 2.78 2,125 2.52
Indian Immigrants 4,890 2.22 1,859 2.21
non-UK born White 10,649 4.84 4,452 5.29
Total 220,042 100.00 84,227 100.00
Source: UKLFS, sample size of selected groups.
Table 2.2: Variable Definition. Duration of Unemployment
Value Definition
1 Less Than 3 months
2 More Than 3 Months but Less Than 6 months
3 More Than 6 Months but Less Than 1 Year
4 Less Than 1 Year
5 More Than 1 Year But Less Than 2 Years
6 More Than 2 Years But Less Than 3 Years
7 More Than 3 Years But Less Than 4 Years
8 More Than 4 Years But Less Than 5 Years
Source: UKLFS, description of unemployment spell.
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Table 2.3: UK Labor Market 1995-2010
Year GDP Growth Unemployment Rate Total Employment Labor Force
1995 3.1 8.6 25,818 28,254
1996 2.9 8.1 26,059 28,356
1997 3.4 7.0 26,525 28,513
1998 3.8 6.3 26,795 28,583
1999 3.7 6.0 27,168 28,895
2000 4.5 5.5 27,483 29,070
2001 3.2 5.1 27,710 29,199
2002 2.7 5.2 27,919 29,448
2003 3.5 5.0 28,182 29,672
2004 3.0 4.8 28,480 29,906
2005 2.1 4.9 28,769 30,206
2006 2.6 5.5 29,025 30,698
2007 3.5 5.4 29,228 30,881
2008 -1.1 5.7 29,440 31,222
2009 -4.4 7.6 28,960 31,355
2010 2.1 7.9 29,034 31,513
Source: OECD
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Figure 2.1: The Survivor Functions for all Ethnicities
Source: UKLFS, sample size of selected groups.
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Figure 2.2: The Survivor Functions Before and After September 11
Notes. Own calculations form the QLFS.
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Table 2.4: Descriptive Evidence for Survival Rates Between Ethnic Groups Before and After
September 11
Interval Beg. Total Deaths Lost Survival Std. Error [95% Conf. Int.]
Uk-born White
Population 0 - 3 months 45883 9966 7610 0.7828 0.0019 0.7790 - 0.7865
Before September 11 3 - 6 months 28307 3602 3904 0.6832 0.0023 0.6787 - 0.6876
6 - 12 months 20801 3024 4088 0.5839 0.0026 0.5788 - 0.5889
1 - 2 years 13689 2086 3498 0.4949 0.0028 0.4894 - 0.5004
2 - 3 years 8105 890 1715 0.4406 0.0030 0.4346 - 0.4465
3 - 4 years 5500 493 1048 0.4011 0.0032 0.3947 - 0.4074
4 - 5 years 3959 333 726 0.3673 0.0035 0.3605 - 0.3741
> 5 years 2900 885 2015 0.2552 0.0040 0.2475 - 0.2630
Uk-born White
Population 0 - 3 months 28651 6667 6777 0.7673 0.0025 0.7624 - 0.7722
After September 11 3 - 6 months 15207 2168 3039 0.6579 0.0031 0.6519 - 0.6639
6 - 12 months 10000 1577 2694 0.5542 0.0035 0.5472 - 0.5610
1 - 2 years 5729 1031 2026 0.4544 0.0040 0.4465 - 0.4623
2 - 3 years 2672 281 688 0.4066 0.0045 0.3978 - 0.4155
3 - 4 years 1703 112 318 0.3799 0.0049 0.3704 - 0.3894
4 - 5 years 1273 69 192 0.3593 0.0052 0.3491 - 0.3695
> 5 years 1012 259 753 0.2673 0.0063 0.2551 - 0.2797
Immigrants from
Muslim Countries 0 - 3 months 1126 163 185 0.8552 0.0105 0.8333 - 0.8745
Before September 11 3 - 6 months 778 65 129 0.7838 0.0128 0.7574 - 0.8077
6 - 12 months 584 79 118 0.6778 0.0157 0.6459 - 0.7074
1 - 2 years 387 52 113 0.5867 0.0180 0.5506 - 0.6209
2 - 3 years 222 21 53 0.5312 0.0199 0.4914 - 0.5694
3 - 4 years 148 10 26 0.4953 0.0216 0.4523 - 0.5368
4 - 5 years 112 6 18 0.4688 0.0230 0.4231 - 0.5130
> 5 years 88 27 61 0.3249 0.0280 0.2708 - 0.3801
Immigrants from
Muslim Countries 0 - 3 months 965 119 206 0.8767 0.0106 0.8542 - 0.8959
After September 11 3 - 6 months 640 70 141 0.7808 0.0143 0.7511 - 0.8074
6 - 12 months 429 57 114 0.6771 0.0178 0.6407 - 0.7106
1 - 2 years 258 40 97 0.5721 0.0215 0.5289 - 0.6129
2 - 3 years 121 13 44 0.5106 0.0250 0.4605 - 0.5584
3 - 4 years 64 5 10 0.4707 0.0287 0.4135 - 0.5258
4 - 5 years 49 4 12 0.4323 0.0322 0.3686 - 0.4942
> 5 years 33 5 28 0.3668 0.0384 0.2921 - 0.4416
Own calculations from the UKLFS
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Table 2.5: The effect of Terrorist Attacks on Exit from Unemployment in the UK. Piecewise
Constant Baseline Hazard
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age -0.0046116 *** -0.0048959 *** -0.0056679 *** -0.0182979 ***
(0.0004533) (0.0004547 ) (0.0004557 ) (0.0022982)
Sex -0.5184377 *** -0.5265733 *** -0.5112038 *** -0.5138993 ***
(0.0118945) (0.0119406) (0.0119627) (0.0443448)
Age Left Education 0.0645049 *** 0.0626545 *** 0.0605822 *** 0.0318055 ***
(0.002465) (0.0024727) (0.0024979) (0.0063062 )
Number of dependent children 0.0553119 *** 0.0540565 *** 0.0517441 *** 0.0095216
(0.0048751 ) (0.0048816) (0.0048969) (0.0167544)
Years Since Migration -0.0092237 *** -0.0092797 *** -0.008477 *** -0.0011408
(0.0025074) (0.0025067) (0.0024932) (0.0017906)
Annual Unemployment Rate 0.1134685 *** 0.1113819 *** 0.1071496 *** 0.1172122 *
(0.0186406) (0.0186438) (0.0186562) (0.063062)
September 11 0.2498424 *** 0.2476405 *** 0.2270148 *** 0.3521281 *
(0.0521782) (0.0521812) (0.0522225) (0.1807357)
Muslim -0.1179568 -0.1136539 -0.0902969 -0.2082347 ***
(0.0690209) (0.0690262) (0.0692807) (0.0661167)
Muslim*September 11 -0.208822 *** -0.2127443 *** -0.1764444 ** -0.0516797
(0.0776148) (0.0776202) (0.0776861) (0.0900646)
Controlled For
Year X X X X
Quarter X X X X
Sector Employed X X X X
Method of Applying jobs x X X X
Residence Region x x X X
Number of Observations 201,395 201,395 201,395 16,472
Number of Individuals 76,625 76,625 76,625 6,454
Log likelihood -86555.322 -86502.025 -86137.022 -6669.5412
Note. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
Note. Discrete time complementary log-log model is estimated where the dependent variable is the dummy
variable indicating whether exit from unemployment occurred. Number in the first row is the estimation
coefficient. To obtain the hazard rate, one has to calculate [exp(β)−1].
Note. Models 1, 2, and 3 use UK-born white population as comparison group and non UK born white immigrants
is used in the last column. YSM takes value of zero for natives.
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Table 2.6: The effect of Terrorist Attacks on Exit from Unemployment in the UK. Log Time
Baseline Hazard
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age -0.0040428 *** -0.0043362 *** -0.0050918 *** -0.0157327 ***
(0.0004507) (0.0004521) (0.0004531) (0.001964)
Sex -0.5107114 *** -0.5190077 *** -0.5040747 *** -0.4955584 ***
(0.0118737) (0.0119198) (0.0119423) (0.0441003)
Age Left Education 0.0640417 *** 0.0621537 *** 0.0600902 *** 0.0304376 ***
(0.0024599) (0.0024677) (0.0024926) (0.0061299)
Number of dependent children 0.0547812 *** 0.053505 *** 0.0511338 *** 0.0123379
(0.0048784) (0.0048849) (0.0048997) (0.0168433)
Years Since Migration -0.0085953 *** -0.0086552 *** -0.0078032 *** -0.0036981
(0.0025066) (0.0025059) (0.0024919) (0.0027029)
Annual Unemployment Rate 0.114508 *** 0.1123678 *** 0.108193 *** 0.1250662 **
(0.0186327) (0.0186359) (0.0186471) (0.0637596)
September 11 0.2546458 *** 0.2524375 *** 0.233174 *** 0.3819625 **
(0.0521546) (0.0521571) (0.052195) (0.1807522)
Muslim -0.1359264 ** -0.1316754 * -0.108193 -0.1324176
(0.068843) (0.0688462) (0.0186471) (0.0851871)
Muslim*September 11 -0.2079435 *** -0.211728 *** -0.1749366 ** -0.0939859
(0.0774783) (0.0774814) (0.077541) (0.0914479)
Controlled For
Year X X X X
Quarter X X X X
Sector Employed X X X X
Method of Applying jobs x X X X
Residence Region x x X X
Number of Observations 201,395 201,395 201,395 16,472
Number of Individuals 76,625 76,625 76,625 6,454
Log likelihood -87618.268 -87562.757 -87206.100 -6746.089
Note. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
Note. Discrete time complementary log-log model is estimated where the dependent variable is the dummy
variable indicating whether exit from unemployment occurred. Number in the first row is the estimation
coefficient. To obtain the hazard rate, one has to calculate [exp(β)−1].
Note. Models 1, 2, and 3 use UK-born white population as comparison group and non UK born white immigrants
is used in the last column. YSM takes value of zero for natives.
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Table 2.8: The effect of Terrorist Attacks on Exit from Unemployment in the UK. Sectoral Dif-
ferences
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age -0.0053455 *** -0.0054014 *** -0.0054023 *** -0.0026295***
0.0004521 0.0004525 0.0004525 0.0005894
Sex -0.5110166 *** -0.5109364 *** -0.5109989 *** -0.4938311***
0.0115761 0.011577 0.0115774 0.0146519
Age Left Education 0.0620064 *** 0.061867 *** 0.0618718 *** 0.0541253***
(0.0024487) (0.0024496) (0.0024498) (0.0029801)
Number of Dependent Children 0.0516355 *** 0.0518002 *** 0.0517501 *** 0.0522612***
(0.0048922) (0.0048934) (0.0048939) (0.0065448)
Years Since Migration -0.0079518 *** -0.0078865 *** -0.0079981 *** -0.0110151***
(0.0025159) (0.0025146) (0.0025199) (0.0035571)
Annual Unemployment Rate 0.107793 *** 0.1079734 *** 0.1080081 *** 0.12941***
(0.0186541) (0.0186556) (0.018656) (0.0240259)
September 11 0.2264144 *** 0.2916856 *** 0.2939172 *** 0.2774509***
(0.0522139) (0.0558747) (0.0559251) (0.0674665)
Muslim -0.1917932 * -0.1999613 * -0.156185 -0.0439404
(0.1049592) (0.1052817) (0.1176662) (0.0975329)
Muslim*September11 -0.1791773 ** -0.1639351 ** -0.2894396 -0.2194464**
(0.0779812) (0.0781017) (0.1831513) (0.1059725)
Secondary Sector 0.01917 0.0449576 ** 0.045382 **
(0.0165875) (0.0201903) (0.0202712)
Tertiary Sector 0.0726406 *** 0.0936623 *** 0.093982 ***
(0.0145689) (0.0176492) (0.0176973)
Missing Sector -0.5856273 *** -0.5372271 *** -0.5341341 ***
(0.0187824) (0.0229644) (0.0230718)
Muslim*Secondary Sect 0.0424277 0.0436744 0.011091
(0.1130798) (0.1129912) (0.1427888)
Muslim*Tertiary Sect 0.1329478 0.1326688 0.115204
(0.1121533) (0.112053) (0.1430243)
Muslim*Missing Sect 0.1937582 * 0.1960051 * 0.0920416
(0.1117997) (0.1116937) (0.1402451)
Secondary Sect*September 11 -0.0799706 ** -0.0814212 **
(0.0334748) (0.0338415)
Tertiary Sect*September 11 -0.0661071 ** -0.0673074 **
(0.0289948) (0.0292265)
Missing Sect*September 11 -0.138747 *** -0.1473477 ***
(0.0374169) (0.038014)
Muslim*Secondary Sect*September 11 0.1050046
(0.2351299)
Muslim*Tertiary Sect*September 11 0.0746891
(0.2316263)
Muslim*Missing Sect*September 11 0.2763604
(0.2324984)
Controlled For
Year X X X X
Quarter X X X X
Sector Employed X X X X
Method of Applying jobs X X X X
Residence Region X X X X
Number of Observations 201,395 201,395 98,597
Number of Individuals 76,625 76,625 42,776
Log likelihood -86189.888 -86182.118 -47822.825
Note. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
Note. Discrete time complementary log-log model is estimated where the dependent variable is the dummy
variable indicating whether exit from unemployment occurred. Number in the first row is the estimation
coefficient. To obtain the hazard rate, one has to calculate [exp(β)−1].
Note. Models 1, 2, and 3 use UK-born white population as comparison group and non UK born white immigrants
is used in the last column. YSM takes value of zero for natives.
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Table 2.9: First and Second generation composition across ethnic groups
UK-born White Immg. from Muslim Countr. Indian Immg. non-UK born White
Native 198,395 0 0 0
First Generation 0 4,375 3,398 10,649
Second Generation 0 1,733 1,492 0
Total 198,395 6,108 4,890 10,649
Source: UKLFS, own calculations.
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Table 2.10: The effect of Terrorist Attacks on Duration of Unemployment in Britain. First and
Second Generation Immigrants from Muslim Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age -0.0046066 *** -0.0048906 *** -0.0056625 *** -0.0182317 ***
(0.0004533) (0.0004546) (0.0004556) (0.0023007)
Sex -0.5185379 *** -0.5266664 *** -0.5113501 *** -0.5134115 ***
(0.011896) (0.0119419) (0.011964) (0.0443599)
Age Left Education 0.0644081 *** 0.0625551 *** 0.0604652 *** 0.0320204 ***
(0.0024664 ) (0.0024742) (0.002499) (0.0063531)
Number of dependent children at home 0.0552287 *** 0.0539733 *** 0.0516111 *** 0.010094
(0.0048766) (0.004883) (0.0048986) (0.016857)
Years Since Migration -0.0126697 *** -0.012785 *** -0.0131402 *** 0.013674
(0.0041454) (0.0041457) (0.004123) (0.0019489)
Annual Unemployment Rate 0.1136362 *** 0.1115629 *** 0.1073857 *** 0.1178045 *
(0.0186415) (0.0186448) (0.0186571) (0.0637519)
September 11 0.2503682 *** 0.2481974 *** 0.2277386 *** 0.354126 **
(0.0521798) (0.0521827) (0.0522239) (0.1807377)
First Generation Muslim 0.0198934 0.0263439 0.0856711 -0.1948694***
(0.1284945) (0.1285506) (0.1282449) (0.0749949)
Second Generation Muslim -0.2152804 ** -0.2119118 ** -0.195782 ** -0.2389963 **
(0.091615) (0.0916183) (0.0919689 ) (0.1072876)
First Generation Muslim*September 11 -0.3154972 *** -0.3204396 *** -0.2846196 *** -0.1233832
(0.1003981) (0.1004271) (0.100445) (0.1075546)
Second Generation Muslim*September 11 -0.0576947 -0.0605673 -0.033643 0.0657297
(0.1260262) (0.1260302) (0.1260613) (0.1356288 )
Controlled For
Year X X X X
Quarter X X X X
Sector Employed X X X X
Method of Applying jobs x X X X
Residence Region x x X X
Number of Observations 201,395 201,395 201,395 16,472
Number of Individuals 76,625 76,625 76,625 6,454
Log likelihood -86553.797 -86500.47 -86135.216 -6668.6927
Note. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
Note. Discrete time complementary log-log model is estimated where the dependent variable is the dummy
variable indicating whether exit from unemployment occurred. Number in the first row is the estimation
coefficient. To obtain the hazard rate, one has to calculate [exp(β)−1].
Note. Models 1, 2, and 3 use UK-born white population as comparison group and non UK born white immigrants
is used in the last column. YSM takes value of zero for natives.
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Table 2.11: The effect of Terrorist Attacks on Duration of Unemployment in Britain. Immi-
grants from Indian and Muslim Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age -0.0048011 *** -0.0050807 *** -0.0058447 *** -0.0173618 ***
(0.0004508) (0.0004522) (0.0004532) (0.0018247)
Sex -0.5151537 *** -0.523214 *** -0.5078451 *** -0.4676462 ***
(0.0117453) (0.0117895) (0.0118119) (0.0382096)
Age Left Education 0.0631604 *** 0.0613515 *** 0.0593754 *** 0.0321803 ***
(0.0024094) (0.0024166) (0.0024412) (0.005406)
Number of dependent children at home 0.0542043 *** 0.0530482 *** 0.0509136 *** 0.0126677
(0.0048215) (0.0048275) (0.0048428) (0.0149744)
Years Since Migration -0.0062868 *** -0.0063313 *** -0.0060116 *** 0.0010677
(0.0016937) (0.0016925) (0.001688) (0.0019342)
Annual Unemployment Rate 0.1114228 *** 0.1094183 *** 0.1053975 *** 0.1054014 *
(0.0184372) (0.0184405) (0.0184538) (0.0570258)
September 11 0.2495226 *** 0.2472118 *** 0.226878 *** 0.3335838 **
(0.0516712) (0.0516744) (0.0517168) (0.1635885)
Muslim -0.174616 *** -0.1702577 *** -0.1391275 ** -0.2075432 ***
(0.0599439) (0.0599466) (0.0602644 ) (0.076023)
Indian -0.0930553 -0.0860957 -0.073508 -0.0868732
(0.060339) (0.0603339) (0.0607911) (0.0736837 )
Muslim*September 11 -0.1880307 ** -0.1920869 ** -0.1584258 ** -0.0580821
(0.0765558) (0.0765608) (0.0766061) (0.0904649)
Indian*September 11 -0.052155 -0.0535021 -0.038433 0.0899598
(0.0749761) (0.0749745) (0.0750382 ) (0.0891469)
Controlled For
Year X X X X
Quarter X X X X
Sector Employed X X X X
Method of Applying jobs x X X X
Residence Region x x X X
Number of Observations 206,209 206,209 206,209 21,286
Number of Individuals 78,456 78,456 78,456 8,285
Log likelihood -88598.443 -88544.535 -88173.395 -8694.0963
Note. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
Note. Discrete time complementary log-log model is estimated where the dependent variable is the dummy
variable indicating whether exit from unemployment occurred. Number in the first row is the estimation
coefficient. To obtain the hazard rate, one has to calculate [exp(β)−1].
Note. Models 1, 2, and 3 use UK-born white population as comparison group and non UK born white immigrants
is used in the last column. YSM takes value of zero for natives.
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Table 2.12: The effect of Terrorist Attacks on Duration of Unemployment in Britain. First and
Second Generation Immigrants from Indian and Muslim Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age -0.0048009 *** -0.0050817 *** -0.0058462 *** -0.0173744 ***
(0.0004509) (0.0004523) (0.0004533) (0.0018269)
Sex -0.5149496 *** -0.5230093 *** -0.5077132 *** -0.4649684 ***
(0.0117491) (0.0117931) (0.0118156) (0.0383234)
Age Left Education 0.0631073 *** 0.0612772 *** 0.0592755 *** 0.031252 ***
(0.0024141) (0.0024216) (0.0024456) (0.0054426)
Number of dependent children at home 0.0542877 *** 0.0531176 *** 0.0509146 *** 0.0118617
(0.0048245) (0.0048304) (0.0048461) (0.015073)
Years Since Migration -0.0060618 *** -0.0063099 *** -0.0064989 *** -0.0031685
(0.0027493) (0.002748) (0.0027378) (0.0029582)
Annual Unemployment Rate 0.1115286 *** 0.1095705 *** 0.1055521 *** 0.1102917 *
(0.0184408) (0.0184443) (0.0184575) (0.0571699)
September 11 0.2498898 *** 0.2477294 *** 0.2273463 *** 0.3483448 **
(0.0516798) (0.051683) (0.0517253) (0.163962)
First Generation Muslim -0.1635894 * -0.1530721 -0.1006697 -0.1221916
(0.0975298) (0.0975098) (0.0975941) (0.1090494)
Second Generation Muslim -0.2169321 ** -0.2133642 ** -0.1980392 ** -0.274016 ***
(0.0916088) (0.0916122) (0.0919526) (0.1032117)
First Generation Indian -0.1108874 -0.0975547 -0.07241 -0.0268077
(0.1032272) (0.1031781) (0.1032286) (0.112152)
Second Generation Indian -0.0695561 -0.0626953 ** -0.0431282 -0.0769736
(0.0847632) (0.0847618) (0.0851139) (0.0960152)
First Generation Muslim*September 11 -0.2663907 *** -0.2723919 *** -0.234483 *** -0.1483733
(0.0975202) (0.0975344) (0.097561) (0.1090577)
Second Generation Muslim*September 11 -0.0564978 -0.0596307 -0.032701 0.0718905
(0.1260233) (0.1260272) (0.1260574) (0.1353523)
First Generation Indian*September 11 0.0008391 0.0028815 0.0114806 0.1373659
(0.0956821) (0.0956039) (0.0957395) (0.1073524)
Second Generation Indian*September 11 -0.1393299 -0.1492737 -0.1350155 -0.0232338
(0.1233641) (0.1233641) (0.1233945) (0.1333125)
Controlled For
Year X X X X
Quarter X X X X
Sector Employed X X X X
Method of Applying jobs x X X X
Residence Region x x X X
Number of Observations 206,209 206,209 206,209 21,286
Number of Individuals 78,456 78,456 78,456 8,285
Log likelihood -88596.931 -88542.892 -88172.024 -8691.8494
Note. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
Note. Discrete time complementary log-log model is estimated where the dependent variable is the dummy
variable indicating whether exit from unemployment occurred. Number in the first row is the estimation
coefficient. To obtain the hazard rate, one has to calculate [exp(β)−1].
Note. Models 1, 2, and 3 use UK-born white population as comparison group and non UK born white immigrants
is used in the last column. YSM takes value of zero for natives.
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Table 2.13: The effect of Terrorist Attacks on Duration of Unemployment in Britain.Different
Intervention Dates
Muslim*September 11 First Muslim*September 11 Second Muslim*September 11
September 11, 2001 -.2030081 *** -.3139925 *** -.0484576
(.0775382) (.1003498) (.1259921)
October - December, 2000 -.2026617*** -.3048271*** -.057828
(.0759776 ) (.0968533) (.126162)
October - December, 1999 -.1425269* -.2120473** -.0462278
(.0765982) (.0961367) (.1306056)
October - December, 1998 -.2448735*** -.3107147*** -.1430022
(.0783297) (.0963748) (.1372451)
October - December, 1997 -.1067229 -.1172978 -.1042398
(.0856758) (.1030563) (.1544326)
Note. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
Note. Discrete time complementary log-log model is estimated where the dependent variable is the dummy
variable indicating whether exit from unemployment occurred. Number in the first row is the estimation
coefficient. To obtain the hazard rate, one has to calculate [exp(β)−1].
Note. Each regression uses UK-born white population as comparison group.
Table 2.14: The effect of Terrorist Attacks on Duration of Unemployment in Britain. Different
Comparison Groups
UK-born White Non UK-born White Black East Europe Asian
September 11*Muslim -.1764444** -.0516797 -.006018 -.0755059 .1758489
(.0776861) (.0900646) (.1002048) (.1002048) (.1329907)
(Original Sample)
September 11*Muslim -.2622632*** -.1180014 -.057006 -.1155211 .0494352
(.0775382) (.1076783) (.1304091) (.1557092) (.1547747)
(First Generation Only)
Note. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
Note. Discrete time complementary log-log model is estimated where the dependent variable is the dummy
variable indicating whether exit from unemployment occurred. Number in the first row is the estimation
coefficient. To obtain the hazard rate, one has to calculate [exp(β)−1].
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Table 2.15: The effect of Terrorist Attacks on Duration of Unemployment in Britain. Unob-
served Heterogeneity with Gamma Frailty. New Sample
(1) (2)
Age -0.0026823 *** -0.007191 ***
(0.0005026 (0.0005255
Sex -0.5839725 *** -0.5952352 ***
(0.0166954 (0.0161662
Age Left Education 0.082311 *** 0.0677471 ***
(0.0033299) (0.0030347)
Number of dependent children at home 0.055047 *** 0.0566731 ***
(0.005733) (0.005725)
Years Since Migration -0.0089696 *** -0.0156746 ***
(0.0027913) (0.004606)
Annual Unemployment Rate 0.1438934 *** 0.1265306 ***
(0.0217217) (0.0212877)
September 11 0.284992 *** 0.2755368 ***
(0.0612577) (0.0601171)
Muslim -0.2703119
(0.0770582)
Muslim*September 11 -0.1951618 **
( 0.0863407)
First Generation Muslim 0.1350635
(0.1437328)
Second Generation Muslim -0.2388676 **
(0.1037732)
First Generation Muslim*September 11 -0.3226356 ***
(0.1126749)
Second Generation Muslim*September 11 0.0033765
(0.1426035)
Controlled For
Year X X
Quarter X X
Sector Employed X X
Method of Applying jobs X X
Residence Region X X
Number of Observations 201,395 201,395
Number of Individuals 76,625 76,625
Log likelihood -85481.308 -90631.357
LR test of Gamma var=0 χ2=55.8224*** χ2=109.935***
Note. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
Note. Discrete time complementary log-log model is estimated where the dependent variable is the dummy
variable indicating whether exit from unemployment occurred. Number in the first row is the estimation
coefficient. To obtain the hazard rate, one has to calculate [exp(β)−1].
Note. Models 1, 2, and 3 use UK-born white population as comparison group and non UK born white immigrants
is used in the last column. YSM takes value of zero for natives.
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Table 2.16: Descriptive Statistics for Different Groups
Variable UK-born White Pop. Immg. from Muslim Count. Indian Immg. Other Immg.
%Gender .57 .67 .53 .51
(.495) (.469) (.499) (.500)
Age 35.08 31.58 35.46 36.11
(13.051) (11.396) (11.835) (11.785)
Age Left Education 16.71 17.63 18.86 18.53
(2.110) (2.994) (3.324) (3.609)
Ysm - 16.34 17.14 17.77
(-) (15.183) (16.786) (15.142)
No. of Dependents .74 1.46 .86 .63
(1.079) (1.505) (1.110) (.992)
Duration of Unemp. 1.62 1.71 1.59 1.51
(1.322) 1.369) (1.250) (1.196)
The number in the first row is the mean of corresponding variable and the number in the second row in
parenthesis is the standard deviation.
Note: Age refers to the average age that the respondents are present in the survey.
Note: Age left Education refers to the age left education that is reported by the individuals.
Note: Duration of Unemployment refers to the duration of an individual spend unemployed, measured in years.
Note. Females are denoted by 0 and males are denoted by 1.
Note. YSM refers to years since migration and takes value of zero for natives.
Note: No. of Dependants refers to the number of children under the age of 16 in the household.
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Chapter 3
Intergenerational ReligiousMobility:
Evidence fromGermany
Metin Nebiler
Abstract
This paper addresses issues related to religious identity which have been the subject of
extensive debate in recent years. Theoretical literature in economics focuses on parents
who are utility maximizing agents with access to socialization of their children and have
specific preferences over ethnic and religious traits they wish to transmit to their children.
In the context of this wider theoretical literature, the first part of the empirical analysis
answers the question about the extent in which religious identity is transmitted from one
generation to the next by using longitudinal data from Germany. In addition, the empiri-
cal analysis investigates how socio-economic characteristics influence the transmission
of religious traits across generations. Furthermore, the paper explores whether the mi-
gration background plays a role in the transmission process. Results show that parents
play an important role in the development of the religious identity of their children in
Germany. The transmission or religious traits across generations varies according to the
socio-economic characteristics of both parents and children. Finally, the empirical re-
search shows that the migration background is an important factor in the transmission
process. Results reveal that vertical transmission is higher among immigrant families by
using data from Indonesia and Turkey.
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3.1 Introduction
Identity is a term that is used by social scientists to understand individual- and group-
behavior. Human-beings can be categorized according to many identities such as,
race, religion, class, job, nationality, ethnicity.The transmission of characteristic iden-
tities of groups is important for the survival of those groups. Some identities are em-
phasized more than others in particular times. What we have experienced in recent
years is that the religious identity has gained more importance in political and cul-
tural debates (Sen, 2006). This research paper studies the transmission of religious
identity from one generation to the next. In particular,the persistence of religious
traits across generations is investigated in comparison with other traits. In addition,
the empirical analysis investigates how socio-economic characteristics influence the
transmission of religious traits across generations. Furthermore, the paper explores
whether the migration background plays a role in the transmission process.
Religious identity is receiving an increasing interest among economists. An eco-
nomic framework on intergenerational transmission was first introduced by Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson (1985). Later, Bisin and Verdier
(2000) presented an economic framework where parents have access to the social-
ization of their children. Their major finding was that the transmission rate among
generations can differ according to the preferences of parents to exert pressure on
their children. Several empirical studies in the economics literature investigated the
transmission of different traits across generations (ethnic capital by Borjas (1995), na-
tional identity by Dustmann and Casey (2010), risk and discounting preferences by Ar-
rondel (2009), generalized trust by Uslaner (2008), gender-role attitudes by Farre and
Vella (2007) as well as Fernandez, Fogli and Olivetti (2004), individual responsibility
by Baron, Cobb-Clark, and Erkal (2008)). Religion has been less studied compared
to other ethnic and cultural traits. Among others, Sherkat and Wilson (1995) docu-
ment that vertical transmission from parents to children during childhood positively
influences the religious behavior of children later in their life. Cavalli-Sforza et al.
(1982) show a strong association between two generations for several traits including
religion among Stanford students.
Although secularization theorists predicted a religions decline as a result of the
modernization of societies, distinct religious groups still exist in the world. The suc-
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cessful transmission of religious traits across generations is necessary for the survival
of religious identity. Two different transmission mechanisms are described in the lit-
erature; vertical transmission, from parents to children, and horizontal transmission,
from peers to individuals. The transmission mechanisms can differ according to the
trait to be passed on to the next generation. According to scholars, identity traits
are developed at early stages of life. The focus of the paper is the first transmission
mechanism; vertical transmission, from parents to children.
Since culture and religion are transmitted from one generation to the next as Boyd
and Richerson (1985) argue, transmission from parents to children is the main part of
this process. Scholars argue that parents are altruistic and consider that children will
be better off by inheriting the family traits. They therefore want to pass on their traits
to the next generation (Guiso et al., 2006). On the other hand, Ter Bogt et al. (2009)
discuss that children do not receive everything from older generations but decide
themselves how much to inherit.
Following up on the theoretical literature, this paper investigates the mechanism
behind transmission of religious traits empirically. The first part of the empirical anal-
ysis answers the question about the extent to which religion and religiosity are trans-
mitted from one generation to the next by using longitudinal data from Germany.
By using several religious groups in the sample, I check whether the differences in
transmission rates are religion specific. The second part explores the role of socio-
economic characteristics in the transmission of religious traits within religion. The
persistence of religious traits can differ significantly in terms of the socio-economic
characteristics of transmitters. Although several socio-economic factors are asso-
ciated with higher religious practice, their role in religious transmission is still un-
known. Thus, the second part investigates whether education, the child’s gender,
neighborhood characteristics and homogeneous marriages influence the persistence
of religious traits across generations. The last part focuses on the role of migration
background in the transmission of religious values across generations. Theoretical
literature focuses on the impact of migration background suggesting that immigrants
transmit religious traits more persistently compared to natives. In order to identify
the effect of being an immigrant, one needs to observe the transmission pattern of
one ethnic group in host and home countries. The goal is to show how ethnic groups
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transmit religious traits at home, as natives, and in the host country, as immigrants.
It is important to note that this type of analysis can identify the overall impact of mi-
gration background instead of decomposing all factors in the process such as role of
ethnic enclaves, etc.
Results from the empirical analysis show that parents play an important role in
the development of religious identity of their children in Germany. I find very strong
and significant persistence of religious identity. It is also documented that not only
the religious identity but also the religiosity is strongly transmitted by parents to their
offspring. It is showed that the transmission is strongest among Muslim families. This
suggests that although Muslim identity is associated with discrimination and disad-
vantage in the integration process (Sachs 1998, Rooth 2010, Adida et al. 2010, Ahmed
et al. 2008), Muslims still preserve their religious identity and Muslim parents play a
very important role in this.
The high transmission of religious traits raises questions about the factors behind
it. Empirical results reveal that socio-economic characteristics of families influence
the persistence of religious traits across generations. In addition, the role of each
parent in the socialization of the child changes according to socio-economic charac-
teristics. The highest variation is observed among Muslim families. Moreover, in line
with the theoretical framework, it is checked whether immigrants exert more pres-
sure on their children to preserve their identity. To answer this important question,
we exploit household data from two Muslim countries, Turkey and Indonesia, to ob-
serve transmission in a Muslim country. We show that the transmission of religious
identity is really high in Turkey and Indonesia, however, the religiosity is transmit-
ted less persistently compared to Muslim immigrants in Europe. This suggests that
immigrant Muslims exert more pressure on their children to inherit their traits since
parents want to protect their identity across generations. I also check whether it is
true for other religious groups and it is showed that immigrants transmit their reli-
gious traits more strongly compared to native counterparts.
This paper contributes to existing research in several ways. First, it is among the
few attempts to provide empirical evidence to confirm the predictions of the theo-
retical literature in economics. The empirical results reveal that the persistence of
religious traits is very strong. Moreover, it is showed that immigrants are insisting
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more on passing on their religious traits compared to natives. Second, by exploiting
the longitudinal data from Germany which contain repeated information on individ-
uals’ characteristics, permanent lifetime outcomes are measured which reduce the
measurement error and report more accurate results. Finally, the transmission of
several traits allow us to reveal the strength of persistence of religious traits.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 3.2, I discuss the theoretical frame-
work in economics while section 3.3 describes the empirical strategy. Section 3.4
presents the data and the religious measures. The results on the intergenerational
transmission of religious identity are reported in section 3.5. Finally, I discuss my
results and conclude.
3.2 Theoretical Framework
Several scholars have studied the transmission of ethnic and religious traits across
generations. As mentioned previously, religious preferences are developed at early
stages in life during which the family plays a significant role. Most studies focus there-
fore on the impact of parents on the transmission process (Bisin and Verdier 2000,
Boyd-Richerson 1985, Sforza and Feldman 1981). This paper follows the theoretical
model of Bisin and Verdier (2000) to provide empirical evidence on the transmission
of religious traits. An important assumption in the economics literature is that par-
ents have access to the socialization of their children and can therefore influence the
preference development of their children. This can take the form of choosing the
neighborhood, school or even friends, of spending time with the children, arranging
marriages or attending cultural events (Bisin and Verdier 2000). Parents have all the
information about the different types of traits. It is generally assumed that parents
are altruistic and consider that children will get more utility by inheriting the trait of
their parents. Bisin and Veridier (2001) define this assumption as the "imperfect em-
pathy" where parents are myopic or altruistic while Dustmann (2010) assumes that
children will get disutility by deviating from the trait of the ethnic group. Typically, it
is assumed that the transmission rate is a function of the socialization efforts exerted
by parents. If not socialized to a specific trait by parents, children adopt the trait of
a randomly matched individual from society. Standard models in economics explain
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the optimal socialization efforts along two factors. First, the socialization efforts of
parents to transmit a specific trait vary according to the value attached to that trait.
Assuming everything else constant, if "trait i" is valued more than "trait j", pressure
exerted by parents on their children for "trait i" will be higher than "trait j", hence the
transmission rate is expected to increase. For instance, a family can exert more pres-
sure on their children to inherit their own religious traits than other religious traits.
The difference between the transmission of religious traits in that specific case can
be explained by the higher value attached to the own religious traits compared to
alternatives.
Alternatively, the persistence of cultural traits can be different for two groups de-
pending on the migration background (in other words,the relative size of the group
in the society). Several scholars argue that in addition to direct socialization in the
family, children can develop their cultural traits through society if the traits are sub-
stitutes for each other. It is assumed that the probability of obtaining a trait from
society is a function of the size of the sub-group which possesses that specific trait in
society. Hence a family which possesses the majority trait in society exerts less pres-
sure on their children since vertical and horizontal transmission are substitutes. For
instance, consider a society where people have either "trait i" or "trait j". If the size
of the group possessing "trait i" is higher Si > S j , the probability that an individual
meeting peers with "trait i" is higher, thus it is more likely to obtain "trait i". Accord-
ingly, parents from majority group ("trait i") will be less likely to exert pressure on
their children since children can learn from society. On the other hand, parents from
minority group (with "trait j") exert more pressure on their children since it is less
likely that their children obtain "trait j" from society.
Bisin and Verdier (2000) incorporated marriage into this model where socializa-
tion efforts are more efficient for homogeneous families. Typically, this affects the
marriage decision of individuals. According to their findings, in equilibrium, immi-
grant groups are more likely to engage in homogeneous marriages, which increases
then the transmission of cultural traits to the next generation. Several other scholars
incorporated additional factors into the model i.e. geographical distance from home
country (Cavalli Sforza et al., 1986) and fertility (Becker and Lewis, 1973).
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3.3 Empirical Strategy
The association between parents’ and children’s outcomes has been widely studied
by economists and sociologists. Studies on intergenerational mobility have mostly
focused on examining the economic outcomes such as income, education, occupa-
tional class, social class etc. All studies use the intergenerational elasticity of the inter-
ested outcome. Consider the following empirical model of intergenerational mobility
Y ci =α+βY pi +²ci (3.1)
where Y ci is the child’s permanent status, Y
p
i is the permanent status of the parents,
and ²ci is a white noise error term. Thus, β indicates how child’s outcome is associ-
ated with his/her parents’ outcome while intergenerational mobility, 1−β, measures
how child’s outcome is independent of his/her parents’. Thus, trait development of
children in equation 3.1 depends on parental outcome of that specific trait.
An important difficulty is to observe the permanent status of individuals. Mea-
surement error on child’s long-run status will be captured by the error term ²c . Hence,
as suggested by Zimmermann (1992), the main problem arises from the measure-
ment of parents’ long-run status. Typically, instead of measuring the permanent sta-
tus, an econometrician observes the current status:
Y pi t = Y
p
i +θXi t +wi t (3.2)
where Y pi t is the current status of parents i at time t, Y
p
i is the permanent status of
parents, Xi t is set of characteristics that causes current status to differ from the per-
manent status at time t, and wi t is a transitory shock. Using short-term status as a
proxy for the permanent status in equation 3.1 causes the intergenerational coeffi-
cient β to be biased downward (Zimmermann (1992), Solon (1992)). Assuming that
E(wi t )= 0 and V (wi t )=σ2w and w is uncorrelated with Y pi and ²ci , one gets the clas-
sical attenuation bias where the probability limit is given by
pl i mβOLS =β(
σ2Y p
σ2Y p +σ2w
) (3.3)
whereσ2Y p is the variance of Y
p andσ2w is the variance of error term. If not accounted
for, measurement error can result with misleading estimates, since (σ2Y p /σ
2
Y p +σ2w )
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is between zero and one, the intergenerational coefficient β in equation 3.1 is biased
downward. The advantage of GSOEP is to observe individuals for a long time period.
This study follows thus the method described by Zimmermann (1992) in his seminal
work, using averaged individual outcomes, which reduces the measurement error
and diminishes the bias of the ordinary least squares estimateβ. Averaging religiosity
over T periods such that
YT =
∑ Yi t
T
(3.4)
and assuming the errors to be serially uncorrelated would reduce the bias such that
the probability limit of β is given as follows:
pl i mβav g =β
σ2Y
σ2Y +
σ2²
T
(3.5)
Averaging the father’s status reduces the bias as a function of the averaging periods
T1.
In the context of this paper, equation 3.1 is useful to understand the transmission
of religious identity from one generation to the next. Since the intergenerational elas-
ticity coefficient β only reports the association between generations, it is difficult to
determine the strength of this association. Hence the same method is used for some
other traits such as trust, years of education, height and weight. I use the coefficients
for other traits to compare the persistence of different traits among generations.
The impact of migration background on intergenerational transmission is iden-
tified by comparing two groups from the same community in their host and home
countries. Difference between two intergenerational transmission coefficients, (βI
- βN )2, captures the impact of migration on intergenerational mobility. This is true
under the assumption that the migrated group in the host country has similar charac-
teristics with the group in the home country before migration. The results can there-
fore also be associated with the socio-economic characteristics of those two groups.
1 However, this derivation assumes that the ²i t is white noise.
2Two different samples with the same ethnic trait are used to compare the persistence of that trait in the home
country, as natives and in the host country, as immigrants. βI is the intergenerational coefficient in equation
3.1 measured with the immigrant sample while βN refers to intergenerational coefficient in the same equation
measured with the native sample
102
Although such an analysis cannot identify the specific impact of factors influencing
intergenerational transmission, the results will report the general impact of migra-
tion background on intergenerational mobility.
This study uses the parents’ outcomes as the independent variable instead of
mothers’ or fathers’ outcomes individually. In particular, the outcomes of parents
are created by averaging the specific outcome of both mother and father to have one
value for the parents’ outcome. We assume that the religious traits and also other
traits examined in this analysis are a combination of both parents and not only one
parent. Averaging the parents’ outcomes can also reduce the measurement error on
the estimated outcome and provide better estimates. Later, it is also checked whether
mothers and fathers have different impacts on the transmission of religious traits sep-
arately.
Similar to the above discussion,the measurement error can be an important source
of bias for other traits. It is more likely that height, weight, and years of education are
measured accurately while trust is not. In this case,the measurement error would
cause the intergenerational elasticity coefficient β for trust to be biased downward.
However, Fehr et al. (2003) showed that answers to trust questions in surveys are
good predictors of strategies in a trust game3. This is important in order to confirm
that the measurement error on trust behavior of respondents is small.
3.4 Data
The main data requirements for studying intergenerational dynamics is to observe
a long-run permanent measure for both children and parents. Panel data surveys
can be used for this kind of studies. The advantage of panel data is that they have
repeated observations, which allow to measure the long-run socio-economic status.
The empirical analysis exploits the German Socio-Economic panel (GSOEP), the World
Values Survey (WVS) and the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS), all three of which
are household based panel surveys.
GSOEP is carried out by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) so as
to collect data on socio-economic characteristics in Germany. It is an annual longi-
3Fehr et al. (2003) conduct a field experiment with 429 respondents where he uses the survey questions asked
in the GSOEP. Those respondents then play a trust game to measure the trust behavior of individuals.
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tudinal survey at the household and individual level. The first wave in 1984 included
individuals in private households in West Germany. The target population was ex-
tended to individuals in East Germany in 1990. The West Germany sample com-
prised around 4,500 households in 1984 while the East Germany sample surveyed
2,200 households in 1990. Both samples are combined to construct a representative
sample for Germany. This study uses 28 waves from GSOEP in the period of 1984 -
2011.
IFLS is a longitudinal survey carried out to collect data on the socio-economic
characteristics of individuals in Indonesia. The survey is at the household and indi-
vidual level and includes 30,000 individuals. IFLS is not an annual survey. There are
four waves available which were conducted in 1993, 1997, 2000, 2007 by the Research
and Development Corporation (RAND) in collaboration with several organizations.
Out of the four waves, the latest one is used since questions regarding religiosity are
present only in this wave.
ReligiousMeasures
Questions about the respondents’ religion are asked in the survey. Most surveys
group religions into four or five sub-groups and merge under an ’Other Religions’
category the remaining religions. In the GSOEP however, religious groups are catego-
rized separately4.
Individuals are classified into different religious groups according to their response
to the question about their religion. In the case of more than one reported religion,
individuals are assigned into a specific religious group if they reported that they are
more affiliated with that specific religion than the other ones. If they reported equal
times for two different religious groups I assign them to the religion that they reported
last. The same is also valid for the parents’ religion. I classify as "parents’ religion"
both parents’ religion in the case of a homogeneous marriage; the father’s religion if
the religion of the two parents is different; the mother’s religion is no information is
available about the father.
It is rare to find longitudinal data that include information about the respondents’
4In the GSOEP, six religious groups are Catholics, Protestants, Other Christians, Muslims, Other Religions, and
No Religion.
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and their parents’ religion, attendance to religious services, basic characteristic vari-
ables and identification of parents and children. In the GSOEP, two questions are
asked in order to identify the religious attributes of the respondents’. The first one is
the "Importance of religion in one’s life"5. The second question regarding the religios-
ity is "Attendance to church or other religious services"6. For the religious attributes
of the respondents I use the question "Attendance to religious services" as a measure
of religiosity. Most studies depend on verbal answers concerning religiosity. This is a
problem in cases where the respondents are interviewed together with other house-
hold members. This study uses a behavioral measure that can be observed, thus, it
is more difficult for household members to influence the answers of the other house-
hold members, which reduces the measurement error.
A numerical value is assigned to each answer to the question of attendance to re-
ligious services so as to make it numerically measurable. Individuals who report that
they attend religious services even though they are not affiliated with a religion are
kept in the analysis. The numerical values that are assigned to religiosity are as fol-
lows; 52 for weekly attendance, 12 for monthly attendance, 1 for yearly attendance,
and 0 for never attendance. Attendance to religious services is thus a variable be-
tween 0 to 52 and defined as yearly attendance to religious services. Thus, as it is the
case in intergenerational income mobility, religiosity can be used to measure the in-
tergenerational association between children and their parents. Later, lifetime mea-
sure of religiosity is constructed by averaging the values of attendance to religious
services for the entire time period that the respondents participate in the survey. The
parents’ religiosity is constructed by averaging the mother’s and father’s religiosity.
Moreover, the averaging is done for every variable that is used in the empirical
analysis. The trust behavior of individuals is reported in the GSOEP7. The lifetime
trust is a variable that varies between one and four where one indicates high trust and
four is low trust. The parents’ lifetime trust is constructed by averaging the lifetime
trust behavior of mother and father. The same procedure is also exploited for weight.
A different procedure is followed for years of education and height where lifetime
5Respondent may answer the question by choosing one of the following options; Very Unimportant, Less Im-
portant, Important, and Very Unimportant.
6Respondents can answer the question by; Once a Week or More, Once a Month, Once a Year, and Never.
7The GSOEP reports four possible answers; Totally Agree, Slightly Agree, Disagree Slightly, and Totally Disagree.
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educational attainment and height are created by extracting the highest reported
value. Similar to other traits, parents’ height and educational attainment are defined
as the average of father and mother. Finally, the panel form of the data is eliminated
in order to create a cross-section data where all variables are lifetime measures of the
corresponding child-parent pair.
An important feature of the data is conducting in-person interviews to minimize
measurement error.The respondents are visited in their address to run oral inter-
views8. Interviews are conducted separately to avoid influence by other household
members while answering the survey questions. This is important since the correla-
tion among parents and children can be biased upward otherwise.
Sample Selection
Before starting the analysis, it is checked whether the sample that is used is a repre-
sentative sample of GSOEP. In order to do that, the characteristics of the individuals
are checked to identify if there is a systematic difference between the selected and
the excluded sample, which can bias the results. The reason to check this is that the
selected sample must represent the population. Otherwise, what the findings can be
correct for that particular sample but may not for the German society.
First, the sample selection rule is described for the purpose of the empirical anal-
ysis. Since intergenerational transmission dynamics are studied, for each observa-
tion one needs to observe both children’s and their parents’ outcomes. The datasets
that are used were not originally conducted for intergenerational studies. However,
since the number of respondents is large and parents can be identified, they can be
used for that purpose. The data are organised into parent-child pairs. The sample
is restricted to the parent-child pairs whose characteristics can be identified. In that
sense, although I start with a high number of observations, after the selection 8,309
child-parent observations are left for Germany. The most important and restrictive
criterion is the information on the identifiers for the parents. Observations are ex-
cluded if the identification for parents, religion, attendance, parents’ attendance, and
parents’ religion is not possible.
Table 3.1 reports the characteristics of the selected sample and the excluded sam-
8One quarter of interviews are conducted through computer.
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ple. Almost all characteristics are similar except age. The difference in age is natural
since older respondents are less likely to have a father/mother who participated in
the surveys. Apart from age, other characteristics are similar which suggests that the
sample is sufficiently representative for the GSOEP.
Table 3.2 shows the distribution of religious groups that are used in the empirical
analysis in both countries. In both datasets four religious groups are selected for the
empirical analysis; Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, and No Religion9.
3.4.1 Descriptive Stats
Table 3.3 reports the sample descriptive characteristics for children in Germany where
religions are distinguished. The table shows that Catholics are more religious than
Protestants. Looking at the table, individuals who are affiliated with Islam religion
attend religious services (9.57) more than other religious groups. This suggests that
when not controlled for other factors, Muslims attend religious services 35 percent
and 177 percent more than Catholics and Protestants in Germany.
Sample characteristics show that all individuals who are affiliated with Islam have
a migration background. Muslim existence in Europe is a recent phenomenon which
started with the immigration of guest-workers from Muslim countries (mainly from
Turkey and ex-Yugoslavian countries). The percentage of Catholics with migration
background is around 23 percent(mainly from Italy and Poland) while it is only around
8 percent for Protestants in Germany. The immigration background can be important
since several studies show that immigrants are more religious and attend religious
services more than natives (Crockett and Voas 2006).
The average years of education for Muslims (10.5 years) is the lowest in Germany.
The educational attainment is much higher for Catholics (12 years) and Protestants
(12.4 years). This confirms the well-documented fact that immigrant groups from
Muslim countries are on average less educated than their counterparts in Western
European societies (Dustmann et al. 2010).
The average age among religious groups is very similar in Germany (around 23).
Furthermore, trust behavior does not differ across religious groups. This may suggest
9The other available religious groups are the Other Christians and Other Religions in the GSOEP. These are
excluded from the sample since the identification of individuals’ religion can be identified clearly.
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that trust behavior is not religion- specific.
Table 3.3 also presents information on height and weight in Germany. Muslims
are on average shorter than other religious groups, while weight is very similar among
all groups. These traits differ from others in terms of transmission dynamics. Genetic
factors play a more influential role compared to cultural aspects. Thus the influence
of parents on the physical attributes of their children is very limited. In that respect,
weight is less dependent on genetic aspects compared to height.
3.5 Estimation Results
This section reports the results for the intergenerational transmission of religious
identity and religiosity. Transition matricies and intergenerational transmission co-
efficients are presented for several traits across religious groups.
3.5.1 The Transmission of Religious Identity
The empirical analysis starts by studying the transition matrix, which is an alternative
measure of intergenerational mobility. It is an nXn matrix where "n" represents the
religion of parents and children. The element Pi j refers to the probability of a child
to be affiliated with religion j given that his/her father is affiliated with religion i. The
degree of persistence of "religion i" is shown by the diagonal elements Pi i . An iden-
tity matrix would imply that every child is affiliated with the parents’ religion, while
complete mobility would imply that all elements are equal to 1/n. The advantage of
transition matrices is that it shows the mobility direction of children moving between
religions.
Tables 3.4 reports the transition probabilities of religious identity across genera-
tions in Germany. The diagonal elements are high in Germany for all religious groups.
The most persistent religion is Islam; given that parent’s religion is Islam, 91 percent
of their children are affiliated with Islam in Germany. Similarly, 84 percent of children
of Catholic parents have the same religious affiliation with their parents. Likewise,
inter-religious transmission for Muslims is very low while it is higher for Catholics
and the highest among Protestant families. Those who choose a different religion
from their parents’ religion, are more likely to choose no religious affiliation. An im-
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portant outcome of the table is that it reports strong persistence of religious identity
among all religious groups in Germany.
As a next step, the intergenerational transmission of religious identity is investi-
gated by using a regression approach. The advantage of equation 3.1 is that it sum-
marizes the extent of mobility in a single number, through an average coefficient. In-
dicator variables are created for each religion to estimate equation 3.1. The results are
reported in Table 3.5. Overall, the estimates show some differences; similar to transi-
tion probabilities, the coefficientβ is the highest among Muslim families. Persistence
of religious identity is significantly stronger in Catholic families than Protestant fam-
ilies. The high transmission of religious identity suggests that the family background
is very important when children decide their religious affiliation. On the other hand,
these results can also be explained by the fact that children describe themselves be-
ing affiliated with their parents’ religion so to please their parents and not because
they actually believe or practice it.
3.5.2 The Transmission of Religiosity
Religiosity can be interpreted as the intensity of religious identity. In this section,
attendance at religious services is used as a proxy for religiosity. It is assumed that in-
dividuals are more religious if they attend religious services more. Here, the sample is
restricted to those who successively inherited their religion from their parents. Since
intergenerational coefficient β is an average coefficient, it is difficult to interpret the
strength of transmission across generations. Other traits are included in the analy-
sis to determine the relative persistence of religious transmission. It is important to
note that some of these traits can be influenced by family, similar to religiosity (ed-
ucation and trust) while the impact of parents can be very limited for others (height
and weight).
Table 3.6 presents the estimation results from equation 3.1. Looking at the table,
all coefficients are significant and positive. The coefficient of religiosity in Germany
is as strong as height and stronger than other traits such as trust, weight, and edu-
cation. Considering that religiosity persistence is as strong as transmission of height
in which genetic factors play an important role, this finding is very interesting. It
confirms the discussion that it is not only the religion pf the parents that children
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affiliate themselves with, but that religiosity is also transmitted persistently across
generations. There are several ways that families can affect the traits acquired by
their children. For example, parents can influence the religious attributes of their
own children through attendance at religious services, childhood religious teachings,
school and neighborhood choice etc. (Bisin and Verdier 2000).
The influence of the family background on the educational attainment of children
is very strong in Germany. The main reason for this can be the institutional aspects of
the schooling system. Early track system adopted in Germany requires decisions of
educational investment to be taken when the child is 10 years old, while this decision
is taken at the age of 17-18 in other countries. As a result, it is more likely that parental
influence is much higher in Germany, which leads to lower intergenerational mobil-
ity in educational outcomes.
The transmission of trust is low compared to other traits. It is possible that par-
ents do not exert pressure on the development of trust behavior of their children. Low
persistence observed in the data can also imply that it is not the vertical transmission
that determines the trust behavior but the horizontal transmission through individ-
ual relations/experiences with peers. Alternatively, the low association between the
parents and children can be a result of measurement error as discussed in the previ-
ous section. Moreover, the coefficient of height and weight is positive and significant.
Unlike the other traits, genetic factors play a more influential role in the intergenera-
tional association of height and weight compared to cultural aspects. The coefficient
on weight is lower than height, which confirms that next to genes other factors may
also influence weight i.e. diets, sports activities, etc.
Table 3.7 reports the estimation results of intergenerational elasticity for differ-
ent religious groups. The intergenerational mobility equation includes gender, birth
cohort, age, immigrant, foreign-born, educational attainment of parents, region of
residence and country of origin as covariates. Since the aim of this paper is not to de-
termine the effect of covariates in religious behavior, they are not reported. Looking
at the table, coefficient on religiosity for all religious groups is significant and large
compared to other traits. This indicates that family influence on the development
of religious traits is very large across all religious groups. This confirms the findings
of Iannoccone (1984) that childhood religious instructions and parents’ mass atten-
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dance has a positive impact on children’s attendance of religious services for all reli-
gious groups. Considering the high transmission of religious identity among Muslim
families (Table 3.5) and the high coefficient on religiosity in Germany indicates that
family influence is stronger compared to other religious groups. Scholars argue that
Muslim families exert more pressure on their children to protect their identity com-
pared to other religious groups (Bisin et al 2008). High persistence of religious traits
among Muslim families can be religion-specific. Muslims are more likely to protect
their religious traditions compared to other religious groups. It is also important to
note that Muslims in Germany are also immigrants. Many theoretical and empirical
studies argue that immigrants transmit religious traits more persistently than natives
(Crockett and Voas 2006, Van Tubergen 2006, Bisin and Verdier 2000). For instance,
results can be associated with being an immigrant Muslim instead of being Muslim
only. The empirical part tries to disentangle the impact of migration background on
intergenerational transmission in the next section.
The transmission of trust is similar across all religious groups. This further con-
firms the previous discussion, namely that horizontal transmission (peer- to-peer
transmission) can be the main component of the trust behavior of individuals. Fur-
thermore, comparing the transmission of religious traits to that of trust behavior
within each religious group suggests that the families prioritize religious traits more
than generalized trust.
The influence of parents on children’s educational attainment shows is similar
across religious groups in Germany. One exception to this observation is the high
educational mobility of Muslim families across generations. The mechanism behind
high mobility can be the result of the low education of first-generation Muslim immi-
grants. By attending schools in Germany, their children are already performing much
better than their parents, which lowers the coefficient β.
The similar persistence of height for all religious groups confirms the previous
discussion, namely that the transmission process does not differ among religious
groups, since, contrary to cultural traits, it is mainly affected by genetic character-
istics. The coefficient on weight is lower for Muslims compared to other religions.
This can be explained by the changing diets of immigrant groups; the association
thus between parents and children is not as strong.
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3.5.3 Role of Socio-economic Characteristics in Intergenerational Mobility
This section investigates whether socio-economic characteristics influence the trans-
mission of religious traits across generations. Although several socio-economic fac-
tors are associated with higher religious practice, their role in religious transmission
is still unknown. It is possible that child and family characteristics can change the
preferences of parents to exert pressure and of children to adopt the parents’ traits.
The impact of those characteristics might also be different across religious groups.
Thus, several regression equations are estimated to explore the influence of socio-
economic characteristics on the persistence of religious traits within religion.
Roles in Family
Until now, the empirical analysis has used the parents’ outcome to estimate the per-
sistence of religious traits across generations. This section investigates separately the
role of mothers and fathers in the development of the religious identify of children
for different religious groups. Table 3.8 reports the intergenerational transmission
coefficient of religion and religiosity. The results are positive and significant suggest-
ing that both fathers and mothers are important determinants in the development of
the religious identify of children. Mothers are more important when passing on the
religion to their children for Catholic, Protestant, and No religion. Muslim families
depicts a different picture where fathers are more important for the persistence of re-
ligion. In other words, when choosing the religious affiliation Muslim children follow
their fathers as a role model, while it is the mother in other groups.
The second box reports the results for transmission of religiosity. Similar to reli-
gion, both parents have positive and significant impact on the religious practice of
children. Parents who are more religious, are more likely to have religious children in
the family. Unlike religion, the impact of parents do not differ, i.e. both parents have
similar impact at the transmission process. An important note is that while all co-
efficients are similar across other religious groups, the religious practice of children
with no religious affiliation has a lower coefficient. In line with the previous discus-
sion, combined influence of parents’ religiosity is stronger among Muslim families
compared to other religious groups.
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Gender
The transmission of religious traits can be different for daughters and sons. It is possi-
ble that mothers are more influential in the religious trait development of their daugh-
ters, while fathers are better role models for their sons. The first box in table 3.9 shows
that mothers are the main channel of transmission of religion regardless of gender of
the child in Catholic, Protestant, and No religion families. The intergenerational coef-
ficient β does not show significant differences across gender in those families as well.
In Muslim families, it is the case for sons that they develop religious traits similar to
mothers while daughters’ religiosity is mainly affected by fathers.
Intergenerational coefficient for religiosity is reported in the second box of Table
3.9. Unlike transmission of religion, the influence of mothers and fathers can be dif-
ferent for sons and daughters. Results reveal that daughters’ religiosity is influenced
by mothers and influence of fathers on sons’ religiosity is higher although the differ-
ences are not significant in most cases. While the coefficients of parents’ religiosity
are similar in Catholic and Protestant families, the effect of mothers and fathers on
their children is more clear in Muslim families.
HomogeneousMarriages
This section investigates whether homogeneous marriages are more successful in
transmitting the religious traits across generations. Homogeneous marriage in this
case refers to parents with same religion. The theoretical framework developed by
Bisin and Verdier (2000) assumes that socialization efforts are more efficient in fami-
lies where the parents share similar traits. Assuming that both parents are altruistic,
persistence of religious traits can be higher among families with homogeneous mar-
riages, since both parents want to pass on the same religious trait. In heterogamous
marriages, it can be less persistent since both parents teach different religious traits
to their children. Table 3.10 reports the intergenerational coefficient of religiosity for
homogeneous and heterogamous marriages. Homogeneous marriages are more ef-
ficient when combining the effects of both parents, which confirms the assumption
in the theoretical literature i.e.that transmission of religious traits is more successful
across generations in homogeneous families. While the influence of both parents is
equally high in Catholic homogeneous families, it differs in other religions. Similar to
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previous results, mothers are more important in the religiosity development of their
children in heterogamous families, while the father’s influence is very small and not
significant in Protestant families. This can be explained by the fact that if one of the
parents is not interested in transmitting his/her religious trait to children, the other
parent can be more influential in the religious trait development of the child in het-
erogamous marriages.
Education
This section investigates the relationship between the education level of children and
transmission of religious traits. Although education is shown to be negatively associ-
ated with religious practices, the impact on transmission is still unknown. The edu-
cation level of the child can negatively influence the transmission of religious traits
since more educated children are more likely to develop their own religious traits
and the influence of parents’ can be lower. Children are grouped into two categories
according to their education level. For each religious group, individuals below the
median person is assumed to be low-educated, while individuals with a higher edu-
cation level than the median are assumed to be highly- educated individuals10. Table
3.11 reports the results for the influence of education on religious transmission. Look-
ing at the first box, religious identity is independent of the education level of children
in Catholic, Protestant, and no religious affiliation i.e. the influence of both parents
do not vary according to the education level of the child. Similar to previous results,
Muslim children show a different pattern. In their case, mothers play a more impor-
tant role in low- educated families, while in highly educated families it is the father.
The second box in Table 3.11 reports the results for religiosity transmission. Ed-
ucation has a more clear effect on religiosity transmission. The combined effect of
parents is higher in Protestant families with low-educated children, while the effect
diminishes significantly for highly educated children. This confirms that educated
children are influenced less by their parents. On the other hand, the combined effect
is similar in Catholic and Muslim families. Parental influence changes however ac-
cording to the education level of the child. Fathers are more influential in the trans-
10While identifying the low and highly educated people years of education is used. The median person is as-
sumed to be highly educated
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mission of religious practices in Catholic families with a low-educated child, while
mothers are more influential towards highly- educated children. In Muslim families,
it is the other way around.
Characteristics of Residence
The characteristics of the neighborhood can be another important factor in the devel-
opment of religious traits. Families can find it for instance easier to socialize children
in the countryside.The countryside is also more likely to have a more homogeneous
population in terms of religious traits. In big cities different traits are more likely to
be observed and be accessible. It is also possible that individuals living in cities are
more likely to access media, education, etc that are negatively associated with reli-
giosity. Table 3.12 reports the results for the characteristics of the neighborhood in
which the child was raised until the age of 16. Similar to previous results, mothers
are in general more important in the transmission of religion to children. The trans-
mission of religion does not vary according to the characteristics of neighborhood.
The coefficients are similar with a slightly higher combined influence of parents in
the countryside. The sole exception are the case of Muslims. While Muslim parents
have a similar effect on children’s religious affiliation in cities, in the countryside how-
ever, it is the Muslim father who has a very influential impact on the transmission of
religion.
The second box reports the results for religiosity transmission according to the
neighborhood characteristics. The results show that neighborhood characteristics
have an influential effect on the transmission of religiosity, as the effect of each par-
ent varies according to the characteristics of neighborhood. For instance, in Protes-
tant families fathers are more important role models in cities, while mothers are more
influential in the countryside. The outcome is different for Muslim and Catholic fam-
ilies, which show a more balanced influence by each parent.
3.5.4 Role of Migration Background in Intergenerational Mobility
The empirical analysis until now suggests that Muslim families in Germany transmit
not only religious identity but also the religiosity trait more persistently compared
to other religious groups. As discussed previously, the high persistence of religious
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traits can be driven by several factors i.e.the value attached to religious traits, ethnic
enclaves, migration background, homogeneous marriages etc. This section focuses
on the impact of being an immigrant on intergenerational transmission of religious
traits. Several studies show that immigrant groups still preserve their identity in host
countries instead of being assimilated into the mainstream culture (Bisin and Verdier
2000, Dustmann 2010 ). For instance, affiliation to religious groups can make the in-
tegration process easier in the destination countries (Bruce 1996). Moreover, immi-
grant families in destination countries can exert more pressure on their children, if
they want to preserve their identity. This can take the form of attendance at religious
services, childhood religious teachings, school and neighborhood choice etc. (Bisin
and Verdier 2000). If the results are driven by being an immigrant, then this would
contradict the findings of Knafo and Schwartz (2009) who claim that immigrant fam-
ilies are less successful in passing on their characteristics to the next generation com-
pared to natives. On the other hand, it would be in line with the findings of Borjas
(1995) who shows strong a persistence of ethnic traits among second and even third
generations.
To estimate the impact of migration background, one can compare the intergen-
erational religious transmission of two groups with the same ethnic background in
a host country and their home country. Assuming that the migrated group in the
host country has similar characteristics with the group in the home country before
migration, the difference between the two intergenerational coefficients, (βI −βN ),
captures the impact of migration on intergenerational mobility. However, the differ-
ence does not only capture the impact of migration but also other factors, which are
associated with intergenerational transmission. Migration can influence the social-
ization preferences of parents. Migrated groups are for instance more likely to engage
in homogeneous marriages, live in ethnic neighborhoods and send their children to
specific schools in order to influence their identity development. Hence, one has to
interpret this difference as a general impact of migration background on intergener-
ational mobility. It is not the scope of this paper to decompose these factors in the
model.
In order to assess whether migrants transmit religious traits more persistently
than natives, we exploit data from Turkey and Indonesia. The goal is to show how
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Muslim communities transmit religious traits at home, as natives, and in the host
country, as immigrants. An ideal approach is to compare Muslims in Germany and
Turkish Muslims in Turkey since 63.2% of Muslims in Germany are of Turkish origin
(Spiegel, 2010). The empirical analysis uses the World Values Survey from Turkey and
the Indonesian Family Life Survey from Indonesia to estimate the persistence of reli-
gious traits in Muslim countries.
Evidence from IFLS
A similar analysis of intergenerational transmission in the previous section requires
household data where parent and child pairs can be identified. The IFLS is a house-
hold data which allows us to estimate the persistence of cultural traits by using equa-
tion 3.1. Although there are four waves available which are conducted in 1993, 1997,
2000, 2007, only the last wave in 2007 contains information about the religious de-
nomination of individuals and includes several questions regarding religious attitudes.
Religiosity is measured by the question "How many times do you pray each day?". It
is a numerical variable between 1 and 8111. To focus on the intergenerational trans-
mission among Muslims in a native country, individuals with migration background
and not affiliated with Islam are excluded from the survey. An important concern
about the IFLS is the cross sectional feature of the data. It does not allow us to em-
ploy the averaging method which reduces the measurement error. Estimated results
from equation 3.1 can be downward biased if permanent religiosity of individuals
deviates from the current status that is measured in the data.
Table 3.13 reports the descriptive characteristics of Muslim communities in Ger-
many and Indonesia. The socio-economic characteristics of the two groups should
be sufficiently similar to compare the persistence of religious traits across genera-
tions. Children are similar in age and males are slightly more representative, consti-
tuting 54% of both samples. The Muslim community in Germany is more educated
compared to their Indonesian counterpart. The data also report better educational
attainment across generations. Because years of education are not reported in the
11In addition, two other questions are included in the analysis: i) How religious are you? - Possible answers to
this question vary from 1 to 4 where 1 refers to "very religious" and 4 refers to "not religious". ii) How many times
do you pray each day (categorical) - Respondents can choose from three different answers which are 1 "given
times", 2 "not everyday" 3 "do not practice".
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IFLS, I calculate the years according to the highest level of education attained. Thus,
the large difference in education can arise because of the measurement error. An im-
portant difference between these two samples is religiosity12. Religiosity persists in
the next generation in Indonesia, while children in Germany attend religious services
less compared to their parents.
Table 3.14 shows the results of intergenerational transmission among Indonesian
families. Looking at the table, the transmission of religious identity is very strong.
The coefficient is stronger compared to religious identity transmission among Mus-
lim immigrants in Germany. This suggest that children respond not only to parents’
preferences over religious traits, but also to society’s preferences at the same time.
On the other hand, the transmission of religiosity reported in columns 2- 4 is small
compared to the one estimated in Table 3.7 for Muslim immigrants in Germany. An
important implication of this result can be that native parents are less protective of
their children as regards their religious trait development, since children can also
learn from the society. The correlation thus between parents and children is low. On
the contrary, immigrant parents are more concerned with carrying on their traits to
the next generation, since they cannot learn these from society. This increases the
intergenerational correlation. These results imply that migration changes the prefer-
ences of individuals. Immigrant parents are more protective about the persistence
of their traits compared to natives since they may not want to see their children lose
their identity.
Evidence fromWVS
As discussed above,the high persistence of religious traits among Muslim immigrants
in Germany compared to native Muslims in Indonesia can be misleading if the two
groups are systematically different from each other. The persistence of religious traits
in Indonesian families can be in general lower than Turkish ones. This section fur-
ther compares Muslims in Germany and Turkish Muslims in Turkey to understand
the transmission mechanism between immigrants and natives. A similar approach
to Borjas (1992) is employed to estimate the persistence of religious traits between
12As noted earlier, religiosity is measured as the yearly attendance at religious services in Germany. IFLS in-
cludes a more detailed information which reports the
118
natives and immigrants. Consider the equation 3.1,
Y ci =α+βY pi +²i
which can be organized as the mean religiosity of individuals from the same birth
cohort as follows,
1/n
∑
Y ci = 1/n
∑
α+1/n∑βY pi +1/n∑²i
Y ci =α+βY
p
i +²i (3.6)
where Y
c
i is the average religiosity of children’s generation while Y
p
i is the average re-
ligiosity of the parents’ generation. Instead of measuring the persistence of religious
traits between parents and children, equation 3.6 measures the transmission of aver-
age religiosity between birth cohorts.
The empirical analysis in this section uses the World Values Survey from Turkey.
First, all three waves in the WVS survey are pooled to construct five-year-interval
birth cohorts as showed in Table 3.15. For each birth cohort the average religios-
ity is estimated. Birth cohorts are then matched accordingly to create parent-child
pairs, by exploiting the fact that an average adult in Turkey becomes father/mother
at the age of twenty13. For instance, birth cohort 1930-1935 is assumed to form a
pair with birth cohort 1950-1955. The empirical analysis assumes that individuals
who belong to the 1950-1955 birth cohort are more likely to be the descendants of
parents from the 1930-1935 cohort. In addition to the WVS from Turkey, the results
from the GSOEP are also reported by using the same estimation strategy. Should
equation 3.6 provide accurate estimates for the persistence of religious traits across
generations, then the coefficients that are estimated with these two strategies for the
German sample would have to be similar.
Table 3.16 reports the estimated coefficients for Turkey and Germany. The first
row repeats the results for equation 3.1 in Table 3.6. The second row reports the
persistence of religious traits for equation 3.6 by using the GSOEP for all religious
groups. Finally,the last row reports the results for equation 3.6 by using the WVS in
13Turkish Statistical Office
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Turkey. The similarity of the results in the first two rows suggests that equation 3.6
is a good approximation for intergenerational transmission coefficient estimated in
equation 3.1. Applying the same method for Turkey reports much smaller transmis-
sion coefficient for native Muslims in Turkey. These results support the hypothesis
that migration background plays an important role in the transmission of religious
traits from parents to children.
Evidence fromGSOEP
A final approach is to divide the GSOEP data into two different samples according
to the migration background; immigrants and natives. The high number of observa-
tions in the GSOEP allows us to do this. In Table 3.17, I report the intergenerational
coefficients of religiosity, education and height among different religious groups. Ta-
ble 3.17 reports the results for Protestants and Catholics. The results show that reli-
gion and religiosity are transmitted stronger among immigrant families compared to
natives. Similar to previous findings, these results conclude that the migration back-
ground has an important impact on the transmission rate of religious traits.
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper studies one important determinant of the formation of religious identity,
namely the religious identity of parents, by using datasets from Germany. I first in-
vestigate the association between parents’ and children’s religious identities by us-
ing simple intergenerational elasticity models. The main finding of the paper is the
importance of parents in the religious identity formation of their children. I find
that parents’ role is very strong in the development of religious traits. A stronger
and significant persistence of religious identity among Muslim families is reported
by the empirical analysis. In addition, I assume attendance at religious services as
indicative of religiosity, and estimate the intergenerational transmission of religios-
ity among different religious groups. I conclude that not only religion, but also reli-
giosity is strongly transmitted across generations. I find that the persistence of reli-
giosity among Muslim families is stronger than among Protestants and Catholics in
Germany. I conclude that persistence of religiosity is as strong as that of height and
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stronger than transmission other traits.
The high transmission of religious traits raises questions about the factors behind
it.The empirical results reveal that the socio-economic characteristics of families in-
fluence the persistence of religious traits across generations. In addition, the role of
each parent in the socialization of the child changes according to socio-economic
characteristics. The highest variation is observed among Muslim families. Moreover,
in line with the theoretical framework, it is shown that immigrants exert more pres-
sure on their children to preserve their religious traits.
This paper is an attempt to understand the religious identity dynamics across re-
ligions in Germany. It is not always easy to find appropriate dataset for studying the
persistence of religious traits across generations, yet further analysis is needed to un-
derstand the transmission mechanism. The findings can be very interesting and may
have further important economic implications regarding the integration process of
immigrants in Europe.
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Table 3.1: Sample Selection in the GSOEP
Variables Sample GSOEP
Age 23.63 41.84
(6.243) (17.842)
Religiosity 4.31 6.33
(10.647) (13.852)
Height 175.02 172.42
(9.404) (9.277)
Weight 74.57 76.67
(15.986) (17.108)
Trust 2.02 2.03
(.313) (.316)
Years of Education 12.14 11.83
(2.553) (2.673)
Gender .54 .51
(.498) (.500)
The number in the first row is the mean of corresponding variable and the number in the second row in
parenthesis is the standard deviation for each group.
All variables in the above table are the lifetime measures of the respondents.Age refers to the average age that the
respondents are present in the survey. Religiosity refers to the average attendance to religious services that is
reported by the respondents. Height refers to the maximum height that is reported by the respondents. Weight
refers to the average weight that is reported by the respondents. Trust refers to the average trust that is reported by
the respondents. The answers range from 1 to 4 where 1 indicates everyone is trustworthy, 2 refers to depends, 2
refers to not always and 4 indicates No. Years of Education refers to the maximum years of education that is
reported by the individuals. Females are denoted by 0 and males are denoted by 1.
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Table 3.2: Distribution of Religions in the Sample
Religions Number of Observations Percentage
Catholics 2,771 33.35
Protestants 2,833 34.10
Muslims 532 6.4
No Religion 2,173 26.15
Total 8,309 100.00
The reported numbers are distribution of religions for children.
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics According to Religious Groups in Germany
Germany
Religions Catholic Protestant Muslim No Religion
Age 23.69 23.92 23.29 23.25
(6.229) (7.087) (4.234) (5.425)
Gender 53.88 51.78 58.46 56.74
(.499) (.500) (.493) (.496)
Years of Education 12.04 12.42 10.53 12.31
(2.556) (2.570) (2.098) (2.479)
Religiosity 7.10 3.45 9.57 .59
(13.318) (9.412) (14.308) (3.218)
Trust 2.01 2.00 2.09 2.04
(.314) (.296) (.447) (.297)
Height 174.84 175.59 171.69 175.20
(9.756) (9.026) (8.864) (9.422)
Weight 74.35 75.38 74.76 73.78
(16.032) (16.488) (15.038) (15.457)
% Immigrant 22.70 7.87 100.00 9.20
(.419) (.269) (.289)
% Foreign Born 44.36 46.64 48.12 33.5
(among immigrants) (.497) (.500) (.500) (.473)
The number in the first row is the mean, the number in the second row in parenthesis is the standard deviation.
All variables in the above table are the lifetime measures of the respondents.Age refers to the average age that the
respondents are present in the survey. Religiosity refers to the average attendance to religious services that is
reported by the respondents. Height refers to the maximum height that is reported by the respondents. Weight
refers to the average weight that is reported by the respondents. Trust refers to the average trust that is reported by
the respondents. The answers range from 1 to 4 where 1 indicates everyone is trustworthy, 2 refers to depends, 2
refers to not always and 4 indicates No. Years of Education refers to the maximum years of education that is
reported by the individuals. Females are denoted by 0 and males are denoted by 1.
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Table 3.4: Transition Probabilities in Germany
Children
Parents Catholics Protestants Muslims No Religion Total Sample Size
Catholics 83.67 10.53 0.04 5.76 100.00 2,793
Protestants 8.86 79.70 0.11 11.33 100.00 2,640
Muslims 0 0.54 91.06 8.41 100.00 559
No Religion 8.63 18.64 0.82 71.90 100.00 2,317
Note. The probabilities are given conditional on parents’ religion.
The numbers that are given in the last column are the sample size for the parents.
Table 3.5: Parent-Child Religion Regression Results
Catholics Protestants Muslims No Religion
Intergenerational Elasticity .74∗∗∗ .65∗∗∗ .84∗∗∗ .63∗∗∗
in Germany (.007) (.009) (.006) (.008)
[.729-.757] [.632-.666] [.832-.856] [.612-.645]
Sample Size 8,309 8,309 8,309 8,309
Controlled for
Cohort fixed effects X X X X
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Gender X X X X
Age X X X X
Parents’ Education X X X X
Equation 3.1 is estimated. The dependent variable is the child’s dummy for the corresponding religion.
Note. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
Note. controls for gender, birth cohort, age, immigrant, foreign born, years of education of mother, years of
education of father, and country of origin.
The number in the first row is the transmission coefficient measured by OLS (β in Equation 3.1), the number in the
second row in parenthesis is the standard deviation, the interval in the third row is the 95% confidence interval,
and the number in the fourth row is the sample size for each group.
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Table 3.6: Parent-Child Regression Results for Several Traits
Intergenerational Elasticity Standard Error Observation
Religiosity .42∗∗∗ (.008) 6,616
Trust .17∗∗∗ (.016) 5,442
Years of Education .44∗∗∗ (.012) 7,217
Height .52∗∗∗ (.013) 6,024
Weight .38∗∗∗ (.014) 6,012
Controlled for
Cohort fixed effects X
Country Fixed Effects X
Gender X
Age X
Parents’ Education X
Equation 3.1 is estimated. The dependent variable is the corresponding child’s variable.
Note. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
Note. controls for gender, birth cohort, age, immigrant, foreign born, years of education of mother, years of
education of father, and country of origin. While measuring education, height, and weight, years of education of
mother and years of education of father are excluded from the regression.
The number in the first column is the transmission coefficient measured by OLS (β in Equation 3.1), the number in
the second column in parenthesis is the standard deviation and the number in the third column is the sample size
for each cell in the table.
The unreported coefficients are due to low number of observations.
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Table 3.7: Intergenerational Elasticity Measures in Germany
Germany
Religions Catholic Protestant Muslim No Religion
Religiosity .39∗∗∗ .45∗∗∗ .51∗∗∗ .37∗∗∗
(014) (.016) (.038) (.022)
[.364-.417] [.423-.487] [.437-.588] [.327-.415]
Sample Size 2,337 2,104 509 1666
Trust .23∗∗∗ .11∗∗∗ .20∗∗∗ .14∗∗∗
(.031) (.026) (.063) (.029)
[.174-.296] [.061-.164] [.080-.329] [.085-.199]
Sample Size 1,699 1,882 294 1,567
Years of Education .48∗∗∗ .47∗∗∗ .15∗∗∗ .42∗∗∗
(.023) (.021) (.077) (.023)
[.437-.525] [.431-.513] [.002-.303] [.374-.463]
Sample Size 2,425 2,426 466 1900
Height .53∗∗∗ .52∗∗∗ .49∗∗∗ .51∗∗∗
(0.025) (.022) (.070) (.024)
[.479-.576] [.481-.569] [.349-.624] [.467-.561]
Sample Size 1,897 2,085 327 1,715
Weight .35∗∗∗ .47∗∗∗ .15∗∗∗ .34∗∗∗
(0.025) (.024) (.065) (.023)
[.298-.396] [.428-.521] [.020-.276] [.297-.388]
Sample Size 1,894 2,080 326 1,712
Equation 3.1 is estimated. The dependent variable is the corresponding child’s variable.
Note. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
Note. controls for gender, birth cohort, age, immigrant, foreign born, years of education of mother, years of
education of father, and country of origin. While measuring education, height, and weight, years of education of
mother and years of education of father are excluded from the regression.
The number in the first row is the transmission coefficient measured by OLS (β in Equation 3.1), the number in the
second row in parenthesis is the standard deviation, the interval in the third row is the 95% confidence interval,
and the number in the fourth row is the sample size for each religious group.
The unreported coefficients are due to low number of observations.
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Table 3.8: Intergenerational Elasticity Measures in Germany, Father and Mother
Germany
Catholic Protestant Muslim No Religion
Father Religion .32∗∗∗ .29∗∗∗ .50∗∗∗ .20∗∗∗
(.009) (.010) (.023) (.012)
Mother Religion .60∗∗∗ .55∗∗∗ .37∗∗∗ .48∗∗∗
(.009) (.009) (.023) (.013)
Sample Size 6,576 6,576 6,576 6,576
R2 .7596 .6423 .8782 .5859
Father Religiosity .22∗∗∗ .24∗∗∗ .26∗∗∗ .08∗∗∗
(.020) (.023) (.038) (.016)
Mother Religiosity .19∗∗∗ .22∗∗∗ .25∗∗∗ .12∗∗∗
(.018) (.021) (.054) (.017)
Sample Size 2,210 2,196 487 1,683
R2 .3162 .3044 .3302 .2020
Equation 3.1 is estimated. The dependent variable is the corresponding child’s variable. Sample is restricted to
parent-child pair where both mothers’ and fathers’ outcomes are identified.
Note. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
Note. controls for gender, birth cohort, age, immigrant, foreign born, years of education of mother, years of
education of father, and country of origin. While measuring education, height, and weight, years of education of
mother and years of education of father are excluded from the regression.
The number in the first row is the transmission coefficient measured by OLS (β in Equation 3.1), the number in the
second row in parenthesis is the standard deviation, the number in the third and the 4th rows report the sample
size for each religious group and R2.
The unreported coefficients are due to low number of observations.
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Table 3.14: Intergenerational Elasticity Measures of Religious Traits in Indonesia
Variable Religon Religious Religiosity(Numerical) Religiosity(Categorical)
Coefficient .97∗∗∗ .25∗∗∗ .14∗∗∗ .30∗∗∗
Standard Deviation .008 .023 .031 .041
No. of Observations 5,605 4,991 4,242 4,996
R2 06326 .0553 .0529 .0624
Controlled for
Cohort fixed effects X X X X
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Gender X X X X
Age X X X X
Parents’ Education X X X X
Equation 3.1 is estimated. The dependent variable is the corresponding child’s variable.
Note. ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
The number in the first row is the transmission coefficient measured by OLS (β in Equation 2.1), the number in the
second row in parenthesis is the standard deviation, the sample size is in the third row, and the number in the
fourth row is the R2.
Note. controls for gender, birth cohort, age, years of education of mother, years of education of father.
Note. Religiosity refers to "How religious are you?". Possible answers to this question vary from 1 to 4 where 1 refers
to "very religious" and 4 refers to "not religious"; Religiosity(Numerical) refers to "How many times do you pray
each day?". The question is answered by a numerical value that the respondents pray each day which ranges from
1 to 81. iii Religiosity(Categorical) refers to"How many times do you pray each day (categorical)?". Respondents
can choose from three different answers which are 1 "given times", 2 "not everyday" 3 "do not practice".
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Table 3.15: Parent-Child Birth Cohorts from the WVS
Parent Cohort No. of Obs Child Cohort No. of Obs.
Cohort 1920 - 1925 36 Cohort 1940 - 1945 239
Cohort 1925 - 1930 75 Cohort 1945 - 1950 289
Cohort 1930 - 1935 120 Cohort 1950 - 1955 411
Cohort 1935 - 1940 180 Cohort 1955 - 1960 624
Cohort 1940 - 1945 239 Cohort 1960 - 1965 741
Cohort 1945 - 1950 289 Cohort 1965 - 1970 740
Cohort 1950 - 1955 411 Cohort 1970 - 1975 842
Cohort 1955 - 1960 624 Cohort 1975 - 1980 883
Cohort 1960 - 1965 741 Cohort 1980 - 1985 613
Cohort 1965 - 1970 740 Cohort 1985 - 1990 172
Note. Cohorts are constructed according to birth years of respondents. The average religiosity of cohorts is
calculated by taking the average value of all respondents born in the specific birth cohort.
Table 3.16: Parent-Child Religion Regression Results Based on Constructed Generations
Catholics Protestants Muslims
GSOEP (Equation 2.1) .39*** .45*** .51***
Standard Deviation (.014) (.016) (.038)
Sample Size 2,337 2,104 509
GSOEP (Equation 2.6) .53*** .44*** .51***
Standard Deviation (.003) (.002) (.004)
Sample Size 144,612 18,466 18,466
WVS (Equation 2.6) .17***
Standard Deviation (.015)
Sample Size 1,209
Note. ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
Equation 3.6 is estimated where the dependent variable is the average religiosity of child cohort.
139
Table 3.17: Intergenerational Elasticity Measures of Different Traits According to Immigrant
Status
Catholics Protestants
Native Immigrant Native Immigrant
Religiosity .37∗∗∗ .46∗∗∗ .44∗∗∗ .62∗∗∗
(.015) (.027) (.017) (.055)
[.340-.401] [.408-.514] [.402-.469] [.511 - .727]
Sample Size 1,772 565 1,944 160
Years of Education .50∗∗∗ .40∗∗∗ .47∗∗∗ .46∗∗∗
(.026) (.045) (.022) (.074)
[.452-.554] [.314-.492] [.432-.518] [.310-.601]
Sample Size 1,822 603 2,218 208
Height .53∗∗∗ .52∗∗∗ .52∗∗∗ .59∗∗∗
(.028) (.055) (.023) (0.113)
[.478-.586] [.408-.623] [.477-.566] [-.367-.814]
Sample Size 1,586 311 1,929 156
Equation 3.1 is estimated. The dependent variable is the corresponding child’s variable. Sample is restricted to
parent-child pair where both mothers’ and fathers’ outcomes are identified.
Note. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
Note. controls for gender, birth cohort, age, foreign born, years of education of mother, years of education of father,
and country of origin.
The number in the first row is the transmission coefficient measured by OLS (β in Equation 3.1), the number in the
second row in parenthesis is the standard deviation, the number in the third and the 4th rows report the sample
size for each religious group and R2.
The unreported coefficients are due to low number of observations.
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